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 ABSTRACT 
 
Designing Pension Programs to Strengthen Formal Labor Markets in Developing 
Countries: The Case of Indonesia 
 
By 
 
Muliadi Widjaja 
      
Date 
 
December 2007 
 
 
Committee Chair:    Dr. James Alm 
Major Department:  Economics 
 
 Despite many studies of the pension systems in developed countries, little work 
has been done on how to apply a sustainable pension system in developing countries. The 
set-ups of pension systems in developed versus developing countries are expected to be 
different because in developing countries much labor is concentrated in informal 
production sectors, while labor in developed countries is more fully located in formal 
production sectors. Informal production sectors are sectors where the government has few 
tools to implement fiscal policies (taxes and subsidies) on firms and labor. This research 
develops a comprehensive system on how to set up pension policies generally in 
developing countries and specifically in Indonesia.  
 The basic set-up of the pension system suggested in this dissertation is 
multidimensional: a short run consumption tax policy to finance a defined benefit plan to 
support minimum physical needs of the older population, a medium run labor income tax 
x 
 
 policy to finance individuals defined contribution fully funded savings plan, and a long 
run skilled labor creation through university education so that individuals are able to self-
finance their own pension savings through the fully funded savings plan. The defined 
benefit plan is important because it serves as a societal redistribution tool, while the 
defined contribution plan serves as a household savings tool. In addition, the skilled labor 
creation serves as a supporting tool so that the pension program can be sustained in the 
long run.  
  A theoretical model is developed from Auerbach and Kotlikoff that utilizes an 
overlapping generation (OLG) computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, calibrated 
for the Indonesian economy by introducing heterogeneity in households including skilled 
and unskilled labor.  I apply a mathematical programming system for general equilibrium 
analysis (MPSGE), developed by Thomas Rutherford. Some parameters used in the 
model are estimated by using econometric methods. The OLG-CGE model is applied in 
order to analyze the impact of consumption taxes and pension taxes on labor supply and 
also to calculate the equivalent variation of the distribution of consumption tax burden 
across generations. Meanwhile, the impact of skilled labor creation on economic growth 
is calculated by applying linear algebra. The main macroeconomic data are taken from 
the Indonesian social accounting matrix (SAM) for the year 2000.  Labor data are taken 
from the Indonesian labor condition 1998-2003.  
My main findings in this dissertation are several.  For the equivalent variations, 
the consumption taxes for USD 1, USD 2, and USD 3 cash transfers per day per person 
give more benefit to skilled labor than to unskilled labor.  The consumption taxes for 
USD 1 cash transfer give incentives to the largest amount of labor, both skilled and 
xi 
 
 xii 
 
unskilled labor, to work in the formal sector. The amount of labor after the consumption 
taxes for USD 1 cash transfer is higher than the initial condition. Increasing the 
consumption taxes for the USD 2 cash transfer decreases the amount of labor in the 
formal sector, with the amount of skilled labor decreasing more than unskilled labor. In 
addition, increasing the consumption taxes for the USD 3 cash transfer would also 
decrease the amount of labor in the formal sector, with the amount of unskilled labor 
decreasing more than skilled labor. I also find that the elasticity of government education 
expenditures with respect to skilled labor creation is roughly 0.3. This means that, if the 
Indonesian central government would like to eliminate the informal sector by 25 percent 
within 20 years or an average 1.25 percent annually, they must increase government 
education expenditures to 8 percent of total annual government budget. Finally, I show 
that the increase of skilled labor would contribute positively to the Indonesian economic 
growth, while the consumption taxes and the fully funded pension taxes would likely 
reduce the current economic growth but increase the future one. 
 My theoretical contributions are several. First, given dual formal and informal 
labor sectors present in an economy, where the latter is dominant, taxation of 
expenditures is preferred to taxation of income because the first may induce labor to work 
in the formal sector. Second, given dual formal and informal labor sectors present in an 
economy, where the latter is again dominant, there exists an optimal level of consumption 
taxes that provides incentives for the highest amount of labor, skilled and unskilled labor, 
to work in the formal sector. 
1 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
Introduction 
 
Demographic changes take place in every country all over the world. In many 
countries, parents tend to have fewer children than those in previous generations, and, 
because of good health facilities, older people tend to live longer than those in previous 
generations (Gruber and Wise, 2001; Weil, 2006).  This situation has led to a decreasing 
ratio of working population to elderly population. Such phenomenon is called an “aging 
population”, and is featured in Table 1.   
 
Table 1. The Ratio of Work Force to Elderly (age 15-59 to age 60+)  
               in Select Countries 
Countries Year 
 2000 2025 2050 
Canada 3.8 2.0 1.7 
China 6.4 3.2 1.8 
French 3.0 1.9 1.6 
Germany 2.6 1.6 1.3 
India 7.8 5.1 2.9 
Indonesia 8.1 5.0 2.6 
Italy 2.6 1.6 1.1 
Japan 2.7 1.5 1.1 
United Kingdom 2.9 1.9 1.5 
United States 3.9 2.3 2.0 
Source: Widjaja’s calculations from “World population prospects: The 2006 revision population database”. 
 
New economic policies are needed to anticipate these changes, including the 
policies in social security provision. For countries that run an unfunded defined benefit 
pension system, it is projected that collected funds will not be sufficient to pay the 
pensions of the future elderly population. The situation threatens the sustainability of an 
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unfunded pay-as-you-go pension system. For developing countries that lack an 
established pension system, the increasing elderly population creates a strong demand for 
the existence of a pension system (even though some countries still rely on existing 
family networks).  Among problems faced by countries with weak social security systems 
and its institutions are: tax evasion, low participation by self-employed workers, liquidity 
problems (e.g., the inability of the system to pay the promised benefit), embezzlement of 
the collected funds, and a large public debt.  
Tax evasion is especially severe in many developing countries since they often 
have a large informal labor market that is hard-to-tax.  Further, under the provision of a 
pay-as-you-go system, taxpayers of social security system understand that the benefits 
they receive are only weakly linked to the taxes paid, and they may evade the payment of 
social security taxes by reporting lower incomes than actually earned, since they do not 
believe that the taxes will be fully reflected in benefits.  
Low participation of self-employed workers is a problem faced not only by 
developing countries but also by developed countries. One of the reasons for such low 
participation of the self-employed is that in a pay-as-you-go system the self-employed 
individual is expected to pay double for himself: once as an employee and again as an 
employer. For many self-employed, such double payment is considered a heavy burden 
on them.  
The liquidity problem is caused by the miscalculation of the government’s system 
planner regarding the taxes that will be received by the government versus the benefits 
that government will pay.  In addition to the social security tax evasion mentioned above, 
the miscalculation between taxes paid and benefits received may exacerbate government 
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budget deficits. Corruption may contribute to this liquidity problem as well, although this 
is more related to the weakness of the government’s budget supervising mechanism. A 
large public debt problem is also caused by excessive payments of social security benefits. 
Under a failed pay-as-you go system, governments in developing countries like Chile 
used public debt to finance the social security benefit. 
This dissertation offers an alternative set of policies toward pension reform in 
developing countries, where formal and informal production and labor sectors exist. The 
system offered consists of three integrated programs: consumption taxes to finance a 
defined benefit program, a fully funded pension as a savings program, and the education 
of skilled labor as a support program for a sustainable pension program. 
The object of research in this dissertation is the Indonesian pension system. 
Currently, although some state-owned pension funds and many private pension funds 
have been running for more than thirty years in Indonesia, there is currently no integrated 
pension system, run either by government or by private institutions. One state-owned 
pension fund runs the retirement fund of civil servants, while the private pension funds 
run the retirement funds for individual third pillar voluntary pensions. It is clear that 
Indonesia does not have solid pension institutions. 
The Indonesian economy comprises vast amounts of informality in the goods, 
labor, and money markets. Informality in the goods market means that firms may sell 
goods without being registered as taxpayers. Charmes (2000) predicted that the size of 
the informal goods market in Indonesia is around 25 percent of total GDP in 1997. In the 
labor market, informality leads to employees working without contracts. Data from the 
Indonesian Central Board of Statistics show that around 65 percent of Indonesian 
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unskilled labor works in the informal production sector. Finally in the money market, 
informality means that lending institutions may not be registered with the central bank. 
Nasution (2004) explained that there are more than 6200 non-bank credit institutions in 
Indonesia in 1991, and he assumes that most of those credit institutions are informal. 
These informal conditions, especially in the goods market and the labor market, 
make it difficult for central and local governments to run fiscal policies.  Informality in 
the goods market prevents the governments from charging taxes on sales and labor 
income. Another implication is that firms that have employed informal labor may have no 
incentive to register as a taxpayer.  The difficulties of the central government in running 
fiscal policy also imply that the central government will have difficulties in setting up a 
feasible and sustainable integrated pension system, especially when a pay-as-you-go 
system is taken into practice.  
 
The Purpose of Research     
There are four purposes of research in this dissertation. The first purpose is to 
study an incentive for the aging population in Indonesia to retire with a decent living by 
providing cash transfers for the retired population. The term “with a decent living” means 
that under the constant prices of year 2005, a retiree in Indonesia may earn a pension 
amount between USD 1 to USD 3 per day per person. In term of the net replacement rate 
for unskilled labor, a USD 1 cash transfer per day per person equals a 30 to 70 percent 
net replacement rate, depending on average wages. Also, as shown in Chapter Four of 
this dissertation, many Indonesians are still working after age 60 because they do not 
have enough funds to currently save for their pension or they did not save enough when 
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they were young. In terms of pension provisions, the first purpose is to provide an 
integrated pension system.  
The second purpose is to look at the distribution of tax burdens across generations 
from the consumption tax for cash transfers by calculating the equivalent variations. The 
equivalent variation is defined as the differences of expenditure at the new utility 
function but different prices because of taxation. The first two purposes will be 
elaborated partially in Chapter Six, and the calibration results are discussed in Chapter 
Seven. The calibration results are also presented in detail in Appendix B.   
The third purpose is to observe how the creation of skilled labor through 
education affects the capability of labor to finance their own pension. An increasing 
amount of skilled labor that is able to self-finance their own pension will release the 
burden of government’s provision of minimum pension budget. This purpose is 
elaborated in Chapter Six. 
The final purpose of this dissertation is to look at the economic growth impact of 
the pension reform by calculating the economic growth from the increase of the annual 
output due to the increase of skilled labor, as discussed in Chapter Eight of this 
dissertation.  
 
Terms and Definitions 
Several common terms and definitions are explained here to be used for the 
present chapter and the future ones. Definitions can be found in Private Pensions: OECD 
Classification and Glossary (2005), Rachmatawarta (2004), Edey and Simon (1998), and  
Feldstein and Samwick (1997).  
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A mandatory pension system is defined as a pension system where the central 
government requires individuals to pay a pension tax of a certain rate. A voluntary 
pension system is a pension system where an individual designs a personal pension 
program through a private pension institution. In terms of the width of participation, a 
voluntary pension system does not provide broad latitude compared to the mandatory one.  
A defined benefit pension system is a pension system where the central 
government or a pension institution determines the benefit amount that individuals will 
receive when they retire,  given a certain rate of previous pension contribution, without a 
clear link between the two. A defined contribution pension system means that the 
government or a pension institution determines the contribution amount that individuals 
must pay for their own pension, and the benefit received later is usually linked to the 
contribution.  
A pay-as-you-go pension system is defined as a pension system where the central 
government charges a pension tax on the labor income of the current working generation 
to pay for the pension benefits of the current retired population. A funded-collective 
pension system means that the government charges the pension tax on the labor income 
of the current working generation for the payment of their own pension benefit in the 
future. 
Privatization means that central government hands over the management of an 
integrated pension system to a private institution.  
In general, prefunding means that the government improves its net assets position.  
Prefunding as in Rachmatawarta (2004) is defined as the government payment of pension 
benefits for the current retiree, taken from other sources of funds outside the pension 
 
7 
 
system, in the transition period of changes of pension system from a defined benefit pay-
as-you-go to a defined contribution funded collective system. 
Iintergenerational redistribution is defined as taxes and transfers taking place 
across cohorts, while intragenerational redistribution is defined as taxes and transfers 
taking place within cohorts. The two types of redistributions take place only when a 
mandatory defined benefit pay-as-you-go system applied in a country. 
Sustainable means that the program has its ability to endogenously finance itself 
and run for a long term, i.e., 50 years. 
  
The Reform on the Social Security System Taken  
At present, many countries have already enacted some reforms of their social 
security system. These reforms are taken largely in order to save the sustainability of the 
program to finance itself. I classify between reform in countries with solid institutional 
pension systems and countries with weak institutional pension systems.  
For countries with a solid institutional pension system, existing reforms include 
(McHale, 1999): reducing benefits (U.S.), changing  retirement benefits from increasing 
rate benefit to flat rate benefits (U.K.),  increasing  retirement age (Germany, Italy, Japan, 
U.K., U.S.), and changing  post-retirement indexation  from wage indexation  to price-
level indexation. Meanwhile, for countries with weak institutional pension system, 
reforms made include (Feldstein, 1998; James, Edwards, and Wong, 2003): changing the 
whole system from a mandatory defined benefit pay-as-you-go system into a mandatory 
defined contribution funded-collective system, privatizations, and pre-funding during the 
transition period (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico ).  
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The Result of Reforms Taken on Social Security System 
McHale (1999) calculated gross social security wealth (SSW) for a given benefit 
formula at certain individual ages for several industrialized countries, which are also 
noted as countries that have a strong institutional social security system. Social security 
wealth is defined as the discounted present value of implied future benefits evaluated at a 
given point in the worker’s life. One of his findings is that there was a substantial loss for 
workers’ SSW in observed country after the reform. Table 2 provides details of SSW 
changes and the reasons for these changes.  
 
Table 2. Changes of Workers’ Social Security Wealth in Several  
Industrialized Countries 
Countries Year of 
Reform 
took place 
Percentage 
change in Social
Security Wealth
Reason for Change 
    Men Women   
French 1993 -8.5 -10.0 Wage indexation to price indexation 
Germany 1992 -2.1 -2.8 Gross wage indexation to net wage indexation
Italy 1992 -3.4 -11.2 Wage indexation to price indexation 
Japan 1994 -2.5 -3.1 Gross wage indexation to net wage indexation
U.S. 1993 -1.7 -1.7 Six months of cost of living adjustment freeze
Source:  McHale (1999), reprinted with author’s permission. 
  
In Table 2, the changes of indexation in the fourth column are the changes of 
adjustment value of the defined benefit of the pension amount.  For example, in price 
indexation, the pension benefit is calculated subject to the changes of price level, whereas 
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in wage indexation the pension benefit is calculated subject to the changes of wage level. 
The cost of living adjustment means that the pension benefit is calculated subject to the 
changes of cost of living. 
 
Studies of Social Security Systems in Developed Countries 
Much previous research has been done on social security systems around the 
world.  I review the most recent as well as the most influential work.  
Country studies usually focus on the impact of a certain system of social security, 
or the impact of a certain reform on a social security system on macroeconomic variables 
such as savings, capital accumulation, and economic growth, as well as on 
microeconomic issues, such as labor supply, redistribution, and welfare. Broer (2002) 
used a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to analyze the impact of reducing  
pay-as-you-go benefits on the Dutch economy. His findings are that the reduction of pay-
as-you-go benefits increases equity through the decrease of pay-as-you-go contributions 
and the decrease of implicit lump-sum taxes on the older population. Fehr and Steigum 
(2002) try to simulate the application of mixed social security system - the combination 
of partial pay-as-you-go system and funded collective system - on the Norwegian 
economy, using a closed economy CGE model. Liégeois (2002) used a generational 
accounting model to analyze the impact of Belgium social security system on 
generational equity, and showed that the increase of the aging population in Belgium 
could increase tax rates on wages by 8 percent under a pay-as-you-go system. Cavalletti 
and Lubke (2002) use the applied general equilibrium (AGE) model to compare the 
impact of the 1992 Amato reform and the 1995 Dini reform on Italian economy. The 
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1992 Amato reform basically changed the benefit calculation from price indexation to 
wage indexation, while the 1995 Dini reform changed the pay-as-you-go with defined 
benefit system into the pay-as-you-go with a notional defined contribution system. Their 
findings are several: the reforms should be able to produce a lower ratio of pension 
expenditure to GDP, but the simulation results highlight some problems poised by 
adverse demographic trends in combination with the pay-as-you-go pension scheme. 
The studies on social security systems also focus on many specific economic 
aspects. There are studies on distributional aspect, i.e. the impact of a certain social 
security system on the intergenerational redistributions and the intragenerational 
redistributions. For the US case with a pay-as-you-go system, such studies include ones  
by  Bennett (1979), Hurd and Shoven (1985), Boskin, Kotlikoff, Puvert, and Shoven 
(1987), Feldstein and Samwick (1992), and Liebman (2001). Bennet showed that the rate 
of return from pay-as-you-go pension system for family pension taxpayer is higher than 
that of single. Hurd and Shoven showed that there exist transfers among cohort in the US 
pay-as-you-go system. In other work at almost the same time, Boskin et al. showed that 
there exist intergenerational redistributions as well as intergenerational redistribution in 
the pay-as-you-go system in the US, and the rate of return is positive for at least the older 
generations. Feldstein and Samwick showed that the marginal tax rate on social security 
earning fell highest on women with a dependent spouse and were negative for men with a 
dependent spouse. Liebman showed that the progressive rate of return on the US pay-as-
you-go system depends not only on life-time earnings but also on other factors such as 
marital status and life expectancy.  
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The impact of a pay-as-you-go system on the fertility of the European countries 
population and US population was analyzed by Boldrin, De Nardi, and Jones (2005). 
They found that the application of a social security system in the US and Europe 
stimulated parents to reduce the fertility. The higher the social security benefits, the lower 
the fertility rates. Engelhard and Gruber (2004) observed the impact of a pay-as-you-go 
system on the poverty of elderly population in the United States, and found that the 
impact of pay-as-you-go in the poverty alleviation of older population in the US is 
positive. 
 At present, research on social security systems and human capital is rare. The 
most recent study that relates social security to human capital is by  Ehrlich and Kim 
(2005). By observing 57 countries over 32 years, they found that the implementation of 
pay-as-you-go systems had an adverse effect on human capital formation.  In their 
regression method, they used three variables as dependent variables: the average 
schooling year in population, the secondary school enrolment rate, and an international 
test score measure. They found that social security had a negative impact on these 
measures of human capital.  Erlich and Kim also found that the system had adverse 
impacts on family formation, fertility, and GDP per capita.  The pay-as-you-go system 
decreased marriage rates and increased divorce rates, it discouraged families from having 
children, and government pension spending had an adverse effect on GDP per capita.  
 
Studies of Social Security Systems in Developing Countries 
The seminal work for analyzing the issues of pension policy in developing 
countries is by James (1994). She proposed that countries with dual labor markets, 
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including formal and informal sectors, should separate the purposes of redistribution and 
the contribution-benefit link in running a pension program. In terms of policy matters, the 
government is able to require taxes from workers and corporations in the formal sector 
but not from those in the informal sector. Her suggestion is that governments in 
developing countries should not implement a pay-as-you-go pension system, as pay-as-
you-go systems combine the distribution purpose and savings purpose. 
There are several reasons behind James’ suggestions.  First, there is not sufficient 
labor income in the formal sector to be charged for pension taxes. Thus, the tax amount 
collected would not satisfy the minimum benefit amount distributed to the whole 
pensioners from both formal and informal sector workers. In many developing countries, 
the amount of labor in the formal sector is much smaller than that in the informal sector. 
Second, there is no government guarantee in the future about the benefit received by the 
contributors in the formal sectors that links to their contribution. The second condition is 
predicted to lead to the evasion of social security contributions by workers in the formal 
sector, either by suspending their participation or by moving to the informal sector.  
James also proposed a type of multi-pillar system for pension programs in the 
developing countries. The first is a universal social security system that break links 
between benefit and contribution and covers everyone, i.e., all the retirees, from both 
formal and informal sectors, and people who never went into the labor force in their life. 
The first pillar is run by the government. The second pillar is a compulsory fully funded 
defined contribution program for employees within certain brackets of income, which is 
usually designed for employees who work in the formal sector and run by the government. 
The third pillar is an additional voluntary fully funded defined contribution. Since it is 
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voluntary, the program will be run by private institutions, and will be followed only by 
certain employees in certain income brackets. 
There is a great deal of literature about the experience of developing countries in 
running pension programs. Linciano (2000) reviews theoretical issues and empirical 
evidence from four different countries. Among these four countries, two are developing 
countries: Chile and Argentina. Having suspended its unsustainable pay-as-you-go 
system, Chile changed its pension system to a mixed system between fully funded and 
pay-as-you-go, with the fully funded making about 87 percent of the total benefit (James 
et al. 2003). Chile’s revised pension program is a mandatory fully funded individual 
retirement account.  Still, the government guarantees a minimum pension to participants 
below a poverty line. Similarly, the pension reform in Argentina comprises a mixed 
system between a private fully funded system, called capitalization regime (CR) and the 
traditional pay-as-you-go system. The obvious advantage is the eligibility for the basic 
benefits for male workers. Individuals are free to choose CR or the pay-as-you-go system.  
Another example of a developing country with formal and informal labor sectors 
is Brazil (Filho, 2005; Giambiagi and Mello, 2006). The Brazilian pension system is a 
pay-as-you-go system with retirement contributions to the program paid by contributions 
from both employees and employers. The Brazilian government also provides a minimum 
pension benefit to employees, and no contribution is required for someone to be eligible 
to receive benefits. Still, with the formal-informal labor market conditions, there exists 
movement of labor from the formal labor market to the informal one.  
Other studies are the pension reform in China (Agarwala, 1997; Dunaway and 
Arora, 2007; Yuan and Feng, 2004).China’s pension system faced short-term as well as 
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long-term problems. The short-term problem is the large amount of pension payments 
required for the enormous number of Chinese civil servants. The long-term problem is 
China’s rapidly increasing aging population. To cope with these problems, China 
reformed its pension system in 1997. The reform comprises three pillars. The first pillar 
is the traditional pay-as-you-go system where the government charges a tax on the 
employers for the benefit of the employees.  The second pillar is the mandatory fully 
funded pension, paid by both employers and employee. The third pillar is the voluntary 
fully funded pension. It is not clear at this point that these reforms have addressed the 
short- and long-term problems. 
There are not many studies on the redistribution effects in developing countries. 
One good case of a mixed system between a pay-as-you-go and a funded collective 
system is James et al. (2003) on Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. Their research looked at 
the distribution impact of pension reforms by gender. Their findings are that in the three 
countries, women accumulated private annuities more than men after the reform. 
However, this effect took place only because the new public pension pillar targeted the 
low earner population, many of whom were women. As a result, low earning married 
women were the biggest gainers from the pension reform.  
There are also studies on the impact of social security reform on labor supply. 
One excellent study is Edwards and Edwards (2002). They analyzed the impact of social 
security reform on the labor market in Chile. Their findings are that reduction of job 
security, decentralization of workers collective bargaining, and the privatization of social 
security altogether reduced unemployment by 1 to 1.5 percent.   
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All of the studies discussed above show that there are two important things to 
consider when applying a pension program in developing countries. The first is the 
sustainability of the pension program by looking at how the program financed itself. The 
second is protection of the formal labor market from the movement of labor into an 
informal one.  
 
The Research Question 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the sustainability of an integrated 
pension system for Indonesia, which may include a savings motive and a redistributive 
motive. Sustainability here is defined as a system that can run in a long term.  The 
research question of focus is: Given the current state of the traditional economy in 
Indonesia, where informal production and informal labor markets vastly occupy the 
economy, how can a sustainable pension that achieves an increasing formal labor market 
be designed and established?  
 
The Methodology 
Following the four purposes of dissertation, there are two methods applied. In 
order to achieve the first and second purposes of the dissertation, I apply a computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model of overlapping generation (OLG) developed by 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). The software to be used in the model formulation is 
generalized algebraic modeling system (GAMS).  The written program for OLG-CGE in 
GAMS is called the mathematical programming system for general equilibrium analysis 
(MPSGE), developed by Rasmussen and Rutherford (2004). Meanwhile, heterogeneity of 
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households in the model follows the one authored by Rausch and Rutherford 
(forthcoming). The attach-to-GAMS solver to be used for solving the simultaneous 
equations in the model is called a mixed complementary program (MCP), developed also 
by Rutherford. Meanwhile, some parameters are estimated using econometric techniques, 
with STATA software.  
  In order to achieve the third and fourth purposes, I apply an econometric method 
combined with a linear algebra method. The econometric method is applied for 
estimating the elasticity of government expenditure to skilled labor creation. The 
software for the empirical work is STATA, and the software for the linear algebra 
calculation is Microsoft Excel.  
 
The Outline of Dissertation 
The organization of the chapters is as follows. There are nine chapters in the 
dissertation. Chapter One contains the fact of worldwide aging problems as a background 
of pension reforms. This chapter also contains many reforms in pension policies that have 
been taken worldwide, especially in the developing countries where formal and informal 
production sectors and labor sectors exist. Studies of many types of pension systems and 
reforms and the impact of aging population on pension are also discussed here. 
 Chapter Two discusses the characteristics and performances of many types of 
pension systems, such as pay-as-you go versus fully funded, defined benefit versus 
define- contribution, in both theory and practice in the developing countries. 
 Chapter Three contains a short discussion based on Law No. 40 /2004 of the 
reform of Indonesian pension, which is a reform from the Pension Law No. 11/1969. The 
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most important reform is pre-funding for all type of workers coverage, either workers in 
the private sector or public sector, skilled and unskilled. This pre-funding issue is the one 
that I translate as a cash transfer redistribution financed from consumption taxes. 
The characteristics of workers and retirees in Indonesia are discussed in Chapter 
Four. I develop a small open economy overlapping generation model for the Indonesian 
mandatory pension system based on these characteristics of Indonesia. There are two 
layers in the model.  The first layer is a cash transfer for low income retirees, financed 
from a consumption tax. The second layer is a mandatory fully funded pension. It is 
expected that the cash transfers will be diminished gradually as workers are able to self-
finance their own pension through the fully funded pension. 
Chapter Five contains the analysis of data and the regression estimation of 
parameters used in both linear algebra and CGE model. The macroeconomic data are 
taken from the Indonesian year 2000 Social Accounting Matrix and various years of GDP 
reports. The data on labor characteristics are taken from Central Board of Statistics 
Indonesian Annual Labor Situation, various years. The data of the central government 
budget are taken from the Annual Report of the Ministry of Finance. 
Chapter Six includes the presentation of the budget impact of cash transfers and 
the impact of skilled labor creation on government budget. The creation of skilled labor is 
an important aspect in creating a strong pension system, either a defined benefit or a 
defined contribution. The creation of skilled labor through university education will erase 
the budget impact of cash transfer pensions and contributes to economic growth. Chapter 
Seven discusses the result of calibration analysis. The calibration results consists of the 
welfare distribution of tax burdens among generations and the amount of labor in the 
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economy after the central government set consumption tax for cash transfer program. The 
impacts of skilled labor creation, consumption taxes for the defined benefit pension, and 
the fully funded savings pension program on economic growth are discussed in Chapter 
Eight. Finally, the conclusions follow in Chapter Nine.  
 
The Brief Summary of Results 
There are three types of results presented in Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight of this 
dissertation. In Chapter Seven, I present some calculations regarding the impact of skilled 
labor creation through university education on the central government budget.  The result 
presented in Chapter Seven is the calibration result on distribution of tax burden across 
generation and the amount of labor after consumption tax for cash transfers and after 
fully funded pension setup. Chapter Eight discusses the impacts of education spending up 
to the university level, consumption taxes for defined benefit pensions, and the fully 
funded savings pension on economic growth.    
The results presented in Chapter Six regarding the skilled labor creation are 
several. In order to eliminate 1.25 percent of unskilled labor every year, the central 
government should increase its education expenditure by a minimum of 8 percent of the 
annual budget from the previous less than 2 percent. The amount 1.25 percent of 
unskilled labor is a proposed long run government program to eliminate 25 percent of 
unskilled labor within 20 years. Currently, the central government has already increased 
the average education expenditure to 4 percent annually. To increase education 
expenditures to 8 percent of total government budget is an affordable task for the 
Indonesian government. One way to achieve that target is by reducing the subsidy for 
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consumption in Indonesia. From the year 2000 social accounting matrix, it is informed 
that although the consumption tax rate reached 7.5 percent of total consumption, the 
subsidy rate is actually slightly more than the tax rate. Therefore, reducing the 
consumption subsidy is one way to change the pattern of government expenditure. In 
addition, the creation of skilled labor will make laborers better able to finance their own 
pension savings and thereby lessen the burden of pension cash transfers from central 
government budget. It is expected that the creation of skilled labor, by eliminating 25 
percent of unskilled labor, will save the government budget by Rp 100 trillion of cash 
transfers in year 2040.   
Chapter Seven presents two calibration results. The calibration results consist of 
the calculation of distribution of tax burden across generations and also the amount of 
labor supply before and after the taxation.  Both results are calibrated under assumption 
that laborers are able to adjust their working hours. Another important assumption is that 
Indonesian economy is assumed to be a small open one. Either capital income financing 
or labor income financing has the same welfare impact of taxation under optimized 
working hours, from USD 1 per day per person cash transfer to USD 3 per day per person 
cash transfer. The calibration of the labor amount before and after the increase of 
consumption tax burden is also presented. The USD 1 cash transfer increases the largest 
labor amount in the economy, both skilled and unskilled. For the setup of the fully funded 
pension plan, 100 percent of labor income financing achieves the largest amount of labor 
in the economy, for both skilled and unskilled labor. 
Finally in Chapter Eight, education spending up to the university level in order to 
eliminate 25 percent of the size of informal labor sectors would increase the GDP by 3.1 
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percent. However, the consumption taxes and the fully funded pension taxes would likely 
decrease the current economic growth but increase the future one. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
The Social Security System: 
Characteristics and Performances 
 
There are four ways to classify social security systems. One way is to classify 
how people support themselves when retired, a classification known as “pillar systems”. 
Another way is to explore how the social security funds are collected. A third way is to 
discuss which part of the payment is defined by the government, either the contribution 
(defined contribution) or the benefit part (defined benefit). One last classification is 
whether the social security payment is obligatory or not. 
Utilizing the pillar system (James, 2004), I divide the system into three pillars. It 
is called the pillar system because it explores which source (s) of income supports the 
living of the retired. The first pillar is known as the “public mandatory unfunded pay-as-
you-go” pension plan. The second pillar is the “mandatory funded collective” pension 
plan. The third pillar is known as a “voluntary private” pension plan. Table 3 elaborates 
more details regarding the pillar system. 
From the classification of collecting funds, we divide the social security system 
into “unfunded” versus “funded” (Blake, 2000; Feldstein and Liebman, 2002; Kuné, 2001; 
Sinn, 2000). Unfunded means the government charges taxes on the wage income of the 
current working generation and transfers the funds as benefits to the current retired 
generation. The unfunded system is also known as the pay-as-you-go system. Funded 
means the central government (or any private institution on behalf of the government) 
charges a tax on the wage income of current working generation, deposits the funds into 
an asset market to earn annuities from it, and then in the future pays back the principal 
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and its accumulated annuities to the same person when s/he becomes retired. Readers 
may refer to the Appendix A for additional information regarding the plan.  
Classifying the system into benefits and contributions, the social security system 
may be divided as “defined benefit” versus “defined contribution”. Defined benefit 
means that the central government sets a certain standard for benefit payments for the 
older population. This system is usually connected to the pay-as-you-go system. Defined 
contribution means the central government sets a certain standard for contribution 
payment from the working population. A defined contribution system is usually linked to 
the funded collective system (Feldstein and Liebman, 2002). 
As the central government determines pension payment obligation, a social 
security system may be classified as “mandatory” versus “voluntary”. The central 
government sets an obligation for the working generation to pay the social security taxes 
in the mandatory arrangement. Individuals set their own pension accounts at private 
pension institutions, and set their own pension payments according to their agreement 
with the institutions in a voluntary arrangement. 
The definitions that I discuss are introductions to further discussions in Chapter 
Two regarding the characteristics and performances of each system. Performances relate 
to characteristics and the social economy of the country where it is applied. In later 
sections of Chapter Two, I elaborate the application of pension systems in the developing 
countries as examples of performances of social security systems related to their 
characteristics. 
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Table 3. The Pillars of Old Age Income Security 
  Mandatory Publicly 
Managed Pillar 
(1) 
Mandatory 
Privately Managed 
Pillar 
(2) 
Voluntary Pillar 
(3) 
Objectives - Co-insurance 
- Redistribution 
- Co-insurance 
- Increase savings 
- Co-insurance 
- Increase savings 
Form - Flat 
- Means-tested 
- Minimum pension    
guarantee 
- Personal savings  
plan 
- Occupational plan 
- Personal savings  
plan 
- Occupational plan 
Financing Tax financed Regulatory fully 
funded 
Fully funded 
Source: James (2004) 
 
 
 
Characteristics of the Social Security System 
  
It is important to study the characteristics of the afore-mentioned social security 
system. By studying the characteristics, we are able to know how the implementation of 
each system affects the welfare of a given society. Below is the elaboration of the 
characteristics of each system. I elaborate the characteristics of an unfunded pay-as-you-
go system compared to a funded collective system, and a defined benefit system in 
comparison with a defined contribution system.    
 
Unfunded and Funded System Characteristics  
Characteristics of a Mandatory Unfunded Pay-as-you-go System There are five 
important characteristics of a mandatory pay-as-you-go system that are important for 
policy analysis in order for the system to work well (Blake, 2000).  
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The first characteristic is a defined benefit, and it weakens the link between 
contributions and benefits as in fact it is possible that the individuals gain more benefits 
than what they paid in contributions. The first characteristic is strongly connected to the 
second, or the size of formality of the labor market. A large formal labor sector is 
important in implementing the pay-as-you-go pension program because a formal labor 
sector means the central government has access to charge taxes on labor. Let us assume 
that taxpayers understand how the system works, and assume that there is a large amount 
of informality in the labor market. The workers in the formal labor sector would then 
move to the informal labor sector, avoiding government taxes, as they would understand 
that the pension benefits received are lower than the contributions paid. 
A third characteristic, intergenerational distribution is defined as the distribution 
of income from higher-income individuals to the lower-income individuals across cohorts. 
Intragenerational distribution is defined as the distribution of income from higher-income 
individuals to the lower-income individuals in the same cohort. These third 
characteristics take place because of the defined benefit characteristic noted above. 
The fourth characteristic is that the pay-as-you-go system has the joint purpose of 
savings and redistribution. Savings and redistribution are not separable in the system as 
the contributions paid are not earmarked taxes because the current working generation 
pays the pensions of the current retired generation. The redistribution takes place among 
the retirees while savings take place among the working generation. 
The fifth characteristic is the sustainability of the system due to population aging. 
As the system includes the transfer of income from the working generation to the old 
generation, a decline of the working generation relative to an increase of the retired 
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generation will cause the amount of income transfer to become relatively smaller.  
Eventually, the amount may not be sufficient to be distributed to the retired generation.  
  
Characteristics of a Mandatory Funded Collective Plan. To make a parallel comparison 
with the pay-as-you-go system, I include five important characteristics of the mandatory 
funded collective plan that are similar to the pay-as-you-go characteristics mentioned 
above. 
 Defined contribution, the first characteristic, strengthens the relationship between 
the contributions paid and the benefits received. Under a defined contribution plan, 
individuals open their own pension account and set the monthly amount paid.  Under 
certain contracts when retired, the same individuals collect the benefits from their own 
account. They can then calculate the benefits received from the contributions paid and 
calculate the relationship between the two. 
 Like the pay-you-go system, the funded collective plan works best under a formal 
labor market. The funded collective system needs continual monthly deposits from the 
contributors, i.e., the people involved have stable incomes. The formal labor sector 
guarantees that labor have a steady income, compared to those who work in the informal 
labor sector.   
 Since benefits in the funded collective system are received by the same 
individuals who contributed, then it has a savings, rather than a redistribution, motive. 
Moreover, there is no impact of an aging problem on the system because the contribution 
does not depend on the current working generation but had already been paid in the past 
by the same individuals.  
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Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution System  
Defined Benefit (DB) Plan. A defined benefit (DB) plan offers an assured income 
replacement ratio in retirement. Still, this is the case only for workers who remain with 
the same employer for their whole career. Blake (2000) found that in the UK, average 
workers change jobs about six times in a lifetime. Every time workers switch jobs, they 
experience a ”portability” loss in respect to their pension entitlement. This is because DB 
plans are generally provided by specific employers, and when workers change jobs, they 
have to move to a new employer’s plan. 
 
Defined Contribution (DC) Plan. According to Blake, the characteristics of a defined 
contribution plan have two different stages: the accumulation and the decumulation 
stages.  
 
The Accumulation Stage  
 
– DC has the advantage of complete portability when workers change jobs. 
However, individual DC schemes tend to have much higher operating costs 
than occupational DB schemes. Occupational DC schemes have lower 
operating costs than occupational DB schemes due to structural simplicity.  
– Individual DC schemes, although portable between jobs, are not fully portable 
between plan providers or even between different investment funds operated 
by the same provider. 
– Total contributions into the DC plans tend to be much lower than the ones into 
the DB plans. 
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– DC plans have explicit (contributor burden) asset risks and other types of risks, 
such as ill-health, disability, and death-in-service. In DB plans, these risks are 
carried by the plan sponsor, not the retiree. This implies additional cost for 
workers to purchase insurance to gain such protection. 
 
 
The Decumulation Stage  
 
Private sector DC plans will generate a high amount for retiree only if the 
annuities market works well. In that context, the value of pension assets will be positively 
related to the value of financial assets. Meanwhile, financial asset markets contain 
volatilities, from future investment return, real earning growth rates, and inflation rates. 
  
 
The Summary of Social Security System Characteristics  
 
To summarize, we may ask several questions as to why a certain social security 
system or combination of several systems might be implemented. 
The first question concerns why a government usually sets a mandatory pension 
system.  There are several reasons why mandatory pension may be chosen. The first is to 
force people to protect themselves for retirement, reducing the burden of the government 
and society as a whole. Another reason is to smooth the consumption of the older 
population. Finally, the system protects the older population from external shocks (e.g., 
the 1997 financial crisis in Indonesia). Table 4 presents a summary of the relationships 
between pension systems.   
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Table 4. The Cross Table of Social Security System 
  Funded Unfunded 
Defined contribution Employees have individual 
investment accounts to which 
they and/or their employers 
make periodic deposits. 
 
 
 
Countries applying the system: 
Chile, Mexico, Argentina and 
Australia 
Employees credit 
individuals’ account with the 
taxes that they and their 
employers pay and then 
accumulate these sums with 
an implicit rate of interest. 
 
Countries applying the 
system: Sweden and Italy.  
Defined benefit Companies accumulate funds 
in pension accounts and pay 
benefits to retirees 
 
 
Countries applying the system: 
U.S. (states government and 
corporate pension plans)  
The current working 
generation is being taxed, 
and the amount is paid to the 
current retired generation 
 
Countries applying the 
system: U.S. and most 
European Countries  
Source: Feldstein and Liebman (2002) 
 
 
The second question is which system governments typically choose. There are 
three economic reasons for choosing a pay-as-you-go system: it has redistribution effects, 
it serves as co-insurance for the older population, and it has low administrative costs 
because of the economies of scale of running a large pension program that applies to 
most individuals. 
There are four economic reasons for choosing a funded system. First, a funded 
system tends to increase national savings. Second, it may develop a capital market during 
the implementation, since the collected fund must be invested in the asset market in order 
to get annuities. However, the second reason does not take place in all countries because 
it still depends on how the government develops the capital market. In addition, like a 
pay-as-you-go system, it also serves as co-insurance for the older population. Finally, 
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because it is flexible in terms of provision, it is not affected by the demographic situation 
(i.e., aging population).  
 
The Performance of Social Security Systems 
 
For the purpose of reform, we should evaluate the performance of each system 
during their implementation period. In addition, evaluating performance is one way to 
compare the empirical facts with characteristics previously mentioned. There are three 
principles for performance evaluation. The first principle is individual equity: the present 
value of the taxes paid and the present value of the benefit received in the future are at 
least equal for individual. Redistribution as the second principle comprises redistribution 
within cohorts (intragenerational redistribution) and redistribution across cohorts 
(intergenerational redistribution). The third is the impact of each system on economic 
growth, including the function of each social security system in poverty alleviation.  
 
The Performance of the Mixed System. A mixed system that combines the mandatory 
unfunded pay-as-you-go system with the mandatory funded collective is mostly 
implemented in South American countries (e.g., Argentina, Chile, Mexico). Even though 
it is defined as a mixed system, the funded collective plan is usually more dominant than 
the unfunded plan. For each country, more than 80 percent of accumulated funds go into 
the funded system. This is because the system has often replaced the traditional pay-as-
you-go system that was run in those countries before the reform but that collapsed 
because of institutional weaknesses. 
 Edwards and Edwards (2000; 2002) found that the implementation of a mixed 
system in Chile increased the wages of labor in the informal sector by 2 percent. The 
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reform itself made contributions in the reduction of Chile’s aggregate unemployment, 
even though small. James et al. (2003) discussed the changing effects of  a mixed system 
in three countries, Argentina, Chile and Mexico.  The most important finding is that the 
reform significantly increased the welfare of the under-educated workers, especially 
women. Women also received more from redistributions than men did after the reform. 
The works of Edwards and Edwards and James et al. on mixed social security 
systems show that the reform of social security systems in Latin America is able to 
increase the welfare of the population. The success of funded systems in Latin America 
in some ways suggests that countries with a pay-as-you-go pension system should change 
to funded systems, given the current decline of the amount of working population that 
threatens the sustainability of most unfunded pay-as-you-go systems.   
 
 
The Summary of Social Security Systems’ Performance 
 
By observing the performance of each system, it can be seen that each system has 
made positive contributions towards the welfare of the population of each country. I 
conclude that the real problem of implying a social security system is not that one system 
is better to another, but whether and how well each system fits the socio-economic and 
demographic conditions of each country and the level of solidity of administering pension 
institutions. Without such awareness, implementation of social security systems will only 
face similar troubles to those seen in the Latin American countries, such as under- 
reported incomes, huge implicit debt, funds embezzlement, failure to pay pension 
benefits, and the like 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
The State of the Indonesian Social Security Program 
 
 
Indonesia, the fourth most populated country in the world, is a country in crisis. It 
was hit by the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Within two years after that, the financial 
crisis grew into a broader economic crisis.  There were four Asian countries hit by 
financial crises at the time – Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand – but only 
Indonesia could not get out of the crisis until recently.  
The explanation is because the Indonesian government is poor, it lacks funds to 
thwart the crisis, and the population is also quite poor. Corruption is rampant. At the time, 
the Indonesian people lack the public life-support in terms of the availability of well-paid 
jobs, a low provision of public education, a low provision of public health care, and the 
lack of a social security system for the retired population.  Even today, the poverty rate in 
Indonesian regencies (comparable to county levels in the US government structure) is 
over 80 percent of the population living below the poverty line. However, per capita 
income has grown up to USD 1280 per capita in 2005 from USD 972 in 1998 (World 
Development Indicators 2006, 2006), exceeding the level at the beginning of the crisis.  
 One of the results of the economic crisis was that it forced changes in the political 
regime in Indonesia. Before, the Suharto regime controlled all the public and government 
institutions, from Parliament to the judiciary. Today, the political situation in Indonesia is 
more democratic. The political parties are not controlled anymore, and people are able to 
vote freely for the President as well as the Parliament. The judiciary has also become 
more independent, and the Parliament is now focused more on the public interest by 
generating legislation that is helpful for the public, such as pension law. 
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 There are two important laws regarding pension in Indonesia.  They are Law No. 
11/1969 about the pension for civil servant and Law No. 40/2004 about the national 
social security system. Although it still has no sub-implementation law, Law No. 40/2004 
reforms a national pension system. Before, even though pension institutions existed in 
Indonesia, there was no integrated pension system. In addition, according to population 
projections by the United Nations, Indonesia faces a rapidly ageing population, and Law 
No. 40/2004 is important in facing this aging phenomenon in Indonesia. 
The commonly used indicator for ageing is the ratio of working population (age 
15-59) to elderly population (age 60+). For Indonesia, in year 2000, the ratio is 8.1, so 
that there are 8 workers able to support the pension benefit of 1 retiree. In 2025, the ratio 
is projected to decline to 5.0, and to 2.6 in 2050. The trend is declining for the next 50 
years.   
Currently, there is no mandatory pension system in Indonesia. Voluntary pension 
programs are many, offered by many private pension funds. The Indonesian government 
itself has four state-owned social security enterprises. Those are PT. Jaminan Sosial 
Tenaga Kerja (Jamsostek, a life insurance for private sectors worker), PT. Tabungan 
Asuransi Sosial Pegawai Negri (Taspen, a pension institution for the civil servants), PT. 
Asuransi ABRI (Asabri, an insurance and pension institution for the member of armed 
forces), and PT. Asuransi Kesehatan (Askes, a health insurance institution).   
 
Description of the Proposed System 
The proposed framework as stipulated in Law No. 40/2004 consists of the 
following: 
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1. Five mandatory programs, namely work-accident protection, life insurance, 
provident fund, pension, and health maintenance programs.  
2. All-worker coverage, including informal workers, with gradual inclusion. 
3. Pre-funding for all programs. 
4. A tripartite board to assist the President in formulating policies on a national 
social security system. 
5. Several state companies to run the program. 
 
The Mandatory Programs 
Among the five proposed programs, the provident fund and the pension program 
are the most relevant to discuss. In the proposed programs, employers and employees 
would pay contributions to the provident fund. The rate of contributions would be 
determined by a set of government regulations. Benefits are the accumulations of 
contributions with interest. They will be paid in lump sum as early as five years before 
normal retirement age. Participants may borrow from the provident fund by pledging 
their benefits. However, this type of borrowing can only be done after a certain minimum 
period of participation. 
 The proposed pension program is a defined benefit type. A participant will be 
entitled to monthly pension if s/he has at least 15 years of contribution. The benefit 
formula will be prescribed in government regulations, and minimum benefits will also be 
set. If someone contributes for less than 15 years, the incumbent will only get 
accumulated contributions. The pension program will also require contributions of equal 
proportions from employers and employees, as determined in government regulations. It 
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is not clear how the rate will be adjusted to respond to the potential emergence of 
surpluses and deficits. 
 
Critical Review on the Proposed System 
Below are critical reviews of the current law, according to Rachmatawarta (2004). 
By the time the critical views were issued in year 2004, he had become the Director of 
Pension Funds, Ministry of Finance, Republic of Indonesia. 
 
1. The proposed provident fund is designed very much like existing provident funds 
under the current Jamsostek program. As benefits are paid in lump sum and may even be 
withdrawn prior to retirement, the program is very unlikely to maintain income after 
retirement. The possibility of pledging the benefits for cash borrowing will even hamper 
the intention to provide protection of income during old age. Experience shows that many 
people tend to cash in their financial rights as soon as possible if they are allowed to do 
so, and soon use up the money unwisely. 
 
2. It can be argued that the purpose of providing lump sum benefits upon retirement 
under the provident fund program competes with the purpose of severance payment as 
required by the labor law. If so, both employers and workers have to set aside funds for 
the same purpose. Unless substitution of benefits is allowed, having two similar programs 
prescribed in two different laws demands further cost and benefit analysis. 
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3. Fifteen-year vesting under the proposed pension program is of course better than 
20-year vesting under the current civil service pension program. However, it is still a very 
long vesting period compared to the one prescribed in Law No. 11/1992 on pension funds. 
This long vesting period may demote the pension program in the wider framework of old 
age income protection. A mandatory pension program should be able to offer an income 
floor for as many persons as possible (with the risk of higher level of funding). 
 
4. Opting-out from the provident fund and pension programs will not be allowed. It 
will discourage employers who already have a voluntary pension program to sustain the 
program. The total costs for the pension promises will become too high for employers to 
bear. As pension benefit formula and level of contributions to the provident fund are not 
prescribed in the draft law, so that an early assessment of total costs is not possible. If 
pension benefits and provident fund contributions are set high in government regulations, 
the existence of a voluntary pension program will definitely be adversely affected. 
Employers will tend to satisfy their obligation to the mandatory program before thinking 
of funding a voluntary one. 
 
5. Charging and collecting pension contributions with variable rates will be very 
difficult. Socialization of the rates of pension contributions will have to be carried out 
regularly. Employers and workers will ask for frequent adjustments in contributions, 
which may have to be made due to surplus/deficits of the programs. They may even 
become very sensitive to financial conditions of the program. 
 
 
36 
 
6. Policy and strategy to maintain the financial health of the pension program are 
only vaguely described in the draft law. As mentioned earlier, no description has been 
made on who will be responsible for any deficits that would occur, although it seems 
clear that government will likely be held responsible to deal with emerging deficits. The 
likelihood is more obvious if the program to cover informal and poorly remunerated 
workers.  
 
7. Confusion shall be anticipated in transforming the existing endowment insurance 
plan for civil servants and members of armed forces to either the provident fund or the 
pension program. Transformation to the provident fund will involve actuarial calculation 
of individual rights and replenishments of any deficits. It is the government who should 
cover the deficits. On the other hand, transformation to the pension program will need 
socialization regarding a change in the method of benefit and payment. The majority of 
civil servants and members of the armed forces will want to preserve the lump sum 
payment of endowment insurance benefits, instead of having only the monthly pension. 
 
8. The lack of a clear transitional plan from various existing programs to the 
proposed system will create uncertainty among the management and employees of  PT. 
Taspen, PT. Asabri, and PT. Jamsostek. Private employers and workers will also be 
encouraged to evade paying contributions for Jamsostek program. 
 
9. Commercial interest of banks and life insurance companies on pension provision 
will be affected. They may argue against the proposed social security system, and in 
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10. Taxation of contributions and benefits is not described. The companies managing 
the programs may not be taxed at all. Although it is understood that taxation is more 
appropriately taken care of within tax legislation, proper descriptions of a general 
framework of taxation may avoid ad-hoc treatment that frequently happened in the 
implementation of the Jamsostek program, the pension program, and endowment 
insurance plan for civil servants and members of armed forces as well as voluntary 
private pension programs. Ad-hoc treatments may have contributed to the lack of 
motivation to participate in pension programs.  
 
Matching the Simulation and the Reforms 
Compared to Law No. 11/1969, there are two reforms of the pension system in 
Law No. 40/2004. The first one is the coverage of a pension for all workers, including 
those who work in the informal sectors. The second reform is the prefunding of the 
pension system. As has already been noted in Chapter One, prefunding means that the 
government finances the pension benefit of the workers not from the pension tax but from 
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other tax sources, such as consumption taxes. A consumption tax is a policy that can be 
taken in the short term by the central government to provide a minimum amount of 
pensions. This is the redistribution part of the simulation, which is also the first part of 
simulation. I demonstrate how this type of tax and transfer affects labor amount in the 
formal production sector, for both skilled and unskilled labor. Meanwhile, the building 
block of the long run pension program is a fully funded program. The second part of the 
simulation is how the fully funded savings pension system affects the composition of 
labor, skilled and unskilled, in the formal production sector. The simulation is done by 
assuming that both skilled and unskilled labors have control over their working hours as 
the central government sets consumption taxes. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
The Overlapping Generation Model 
 
 
The model used is the Overlapping Generation (OLG) model with heterogeneous 
agents, labor in the formal sector, and labor in the informal sector. The OLG model itself 
follows the initial work of Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). The heterogeneous OLG is 
considered an apt OLG model to catch the picture of developing countries with a dual 
economy, formal and informal sectors of labor and goods markets. Avitabile (2003) 
presents examples of modeling informality with heterogeneous agents. 
Neri (as cited by Filho, 2005) suggested that the main difference between formal 
and informal jobs concerns taxes and labor costs. In Indonesia, where tax evasion is very 
high due to the low law enforcement, employers choose to do business in the formal 
sector only if their firm is sufficiently large (e.g., employment exceeds 10 employees 
with sufficient capital), so that the government is able to deal with them and charge them 
taxes, or only if the firm wishes to be in the formal sector, say, to get the bank lending 
with low interest rates. This behavior explains the vast amount of labor in the formal 
sector (65 percent of the total labor).  
 The main purpose of this model is to construct the consumption behavior of the 
Indonesian household members among young workers (age 21-55) and old pensioners 
(56-65).  As has been shown by Cameron and Cobb-Clark (2001; 2002; forthcoming), the 
characteristic of a typical family in Indonesia is co-residing between the young worker 
and the older parents.  They also show that there are cash transfers from the young to the 
old. Still, they also found that the Indonesian older population is often working at the age 
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when they are supposed to retire. They found that the co-residency is only part of the 
culture, which could break down in the future, while the amount of transfers might be too 
little to support the need of the old.  United Nations made estimates that by the year 2025 
the Indonesian aged population (age 60+) will be increased by 100 percent, while the 
amount of total population will decrease. 
I use the model to simulate proposed reforms of the Indonesian pension system. 
Before we proceed, readers may ask what is so important about the pension program for 
Indonesian retired population. Table 4.1 reveals that pension income is the largest amount 
of income of the retired population, whether they continue to work or retire after the 
retirement age 55.  
 
Table 5. Indonesia Men’s Monthly Income (Thousand Rp.)  
 Age Group 
 41-55 56-65 66-75 
Employed in 1993    
Median own labor income 133.1 54.9 33.2 
Fraction receiving any other income (%) 83 90 89 
Fraction receiving any other labor income (%) 64 68 64 
Median per capita other labor income 16.2 11.4 12.2 
Fraction receiving transfers (%) 54 64 66 
Median per capita amount transferred 3.1 3.6 3.6 
Fraction receiving pension income (%) 2 6 6 
Median government pension amount 274.6 255.9 213.3 
Number of observation (people) 1393 527 202 
    
Not Employed in 1993    
Fraction receiving any income (%) 85 91 89 
Fraction receiving any other labor income (%) 61 59 54 
Median per capita other labor income 27.4 27.1 26.2 
Fraction receiving transfers (%) 52 62 60 
Median per capita amount transferred 2.3 6.0 8.6 
Fraction receiving pension income (%) 15 38 25 
Median government pension amount 151.3 235.2 217.9 
Number of observation (people) 54 106 102 
Source: McKee (2006), calculated from the Indonesian Family Life Survey 1993. Table is reprinted with author’s permission.  
Note:  the average exchange rate:  in 1997 1USD = Rp. 2500, in 1993 1USD = Rp. 2000.  
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Because pensions are the largest amount of income, and by itself the largest 
portion of income for the retirees, it becomes the most important source of income for the 
retirees.   Most pension income is received from the government. Table 4.1 shows that 
the group of people who continue to work at the age they are supposed to retire usually 
do not receive pension income. Table 4.1 also shows also that only 6 percent of people 
still employed in the age group 56-65 received pension income, compared to 38 percent 
of those not employed of the same age group.  Therefore, it is important to propose a 
pension program for Indonesia.  
The integrated system proposed in the model consists of two pillars. The first 
pillar is a minimum subsistence cash transfer plan from the central government, with a 
defined benefit characteristic for the minimum physical needs of the retirees. The 
program is needed at least in the short run. The second is a long run mandatory fully 
funded savings plan that links the contribution and the benefit. Brook and Whitehouse 
(2006), in evaluating the performance of pension system in Turkey, state the importance 
of an integrated pension system for an economy with formal and informal labor sectors.  
The two systems are proposed together since I separate the redistribution purpose 
of applying a defined benefit system, from the purpose of strengthening the link between 
contributions and benefits that exist under a fully funded system. Corsetti and Schmidt-
Hebbel (1997) state that the separation between the two gives a third implication: the 
replacement of the implicit intergenerational debt of a pay-as-you-go system by an 
explicit personal debt in the fully-funded system.  
The source of funds for redistribution are assumed to be taken from an indirect tax 
like the consumption tax, either value added taxes (VAT) or excise taxes, since these 
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kinds of taxes break the link between the benefit and contribution that exists in the 
mandatory pay-as-you-go system. The logic behind the choice of a consumption tax is 
straightforward. A consumption tax, either a gross receipts tax, a sales tax, or a value 
added tax, reduces consumption of the consumers who have income. From the 
macroeconomy perspective, by taxing the consumers’ budget and transferring the amount 
to the population in need, the central government does not reduce the whole consumption 
but redistributes the income. 
Using other kinds of taxes to finance a defined benefit plan will bring many issues 
to the program. Using income and payroll taxes to finance such a program brings the 
issue of the link between the contribution and the benefit. Taxing corporate income to 
finance a defined benefit plan will make many firms operating in the formal sector move 
to the informal sector, while taxing payroll income stimulates labor to do the same.  
Taxing capital income especially in a developing country like Indonesia, is also very 
difficult.  The property tax is a possible choice, but these taxes are collected by local 
governments. 
Regarding the pension program that links the contribution and the benefit as a 
second pillar, I simulate the application of mandatory fully funded system in the formal 
sector. This is the building block for the long run pension program in Indonesia.  
. 
The Model 
Agents are born with zero assets and have different productivity due to their age. 
Households are endowed with 1 unit of labor. Labor will try to enter the formal sector if 
possible, since the wages are higher there and workers also received some other benefits, 
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such as fringe benefits. Still, the formal sector, either private or government, is not easy 
to access. The education and human relationship of workers play important roles in 
determining their ability to enter the formal sector. From the income they make, labor 
decides how much to consume, how much to save, and how much to transfer to the 
parents.    
 Agents live from age 1 to age 65. Here I assume that agents die at age 66, which 
follows Indonesian life expectancy. Their productivity characteristics are determined by 
age and experience. In determining the productivity characteristics of labor, I  follow the 
method of Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987).1 
 
Preferences, Endowments, and Technology 
The households have preferences over the homogeneous consumption good and 
leisure, given by the following: 
(1)     [ ]),(65
0
itit
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The symbol β j is the present value function of the utility function u(.). The symbol ct and 
lt are consumption and leisure, respectively.  The subscript t denotes the time period. 
The OLG model comprises the working and retired generations endowed with 
initial assets ownership and one unit of time that they are able to allocate between work 
and leisure. The annual utility function of agents is given by the constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) function: 
                                                 
1 Another method in determining the labor productivity idiosyncratic is by applying the Markov calibration 
procedure to the labor data.   
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where ε is the time allocated for working,  ε
ε )1( −   is the ratio of time between leisure 
and working (also represents the shadow price for leisure),  is consumption, and  is 
leisure. The symbol ρ is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure.  
tc tl
The idiosyncratic labor productivity (Productivity Index) for Indonesia is given by 
the following function: 
(3) [ ] )4493.8(/*0012.0*1128.04493.8)( 2 ExpAAExpAPI −+=   
This productivity index follows the model of Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987).  The 
productivity index measures the productivity of labor according to age and wages. It is a 
linear combination between skilled and unskilled labor in the formal sector only. I 
assume that the productivity index is positively related to age A, but negatively related to 
the square of age A2.  This means that the production capacity of labor increases at the 
beginning, has its peak at a certain age (age 47), and after that goes down until the worker 
retires. 
I estimate the productivity index for Indonesia by using raw labor age and wages 
data from 1998-2002. The data are taken in that time range as the dynamic CGE model 
starts from year 2000, so that the labor data fit the data around the year 2000. In addition, 
the amount of samples from five year intervals satisfies the minimum amount of samples 
to do the estimation. The estimation result is presented in Chapter Five. 
There are two sectors in the economy, the formal and informal sectors, with two 
types of labor, skilled labor Ls and unskilled labor Lu. Both skilled labor and unskilled 
labor work in the formal sector, while only unskilled labor works in the informal sector. 
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It should be noted that, the year 2000 labor data (presented in Chapter Five) show that 
there is a small amount of skilled labor in the informal sector (0.5 percent of total labor). 
Because the amount is small, I ignore the role of the skilled labor in the informal sector. 
According to Margono and Sharma (2004), the production function in Indonesia 
can be modeled according to the Cobb-Douglass production technology.  The formal 
sector produces with the following Cobb-Douglas technology: 
(4) ωγα UFSF  FFFFF LLKZLKFY == ),(
Variable YF is the value added of the formal sector, and ZF is the technology level of the 
production function in the formal sector. The symbol α is the elasticity of production of 
capital, γ is the elasticity of production of skilled labor, and θ is the elasticity of 
production of unskilled labor, with the sum of  α, γ, and  ω equal to 1.  
The informal sector has a labor intensive technology with capital and unskilled 
labor: 
(5) ωα I  IIIII LKZLKFY == ),(
Variable YI is the value added of the informal sector, and AI is the technology level of the 
production function in the informal sector. Equation (5) follows the Cobb-Douglas 
production function with a low value of α for the production elasticity of capital, as the 
informal sector production function is labor intensive. The sum of α and ω is equal to 1. 
 
The Households Sector 
The working generations in the formal sector have to choose their consumption , 
the risk free assets holding  and the number of hours to work. The utility function 
follows a constant elasticity of substitution function.  
tc
ta
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The value function of skilled workers in the formal sector is: 
(6) [ ]{ }LatVlcuLatV tttlacF ,,1(),(max).,( ,, ++= φ   
Variable t (time) represents labor’s age and variable L is the working hour of labor. The 
value of φ is between and inclusive 0 and 1. The state and control variable in the model is 
variable time t, variable asset at, and variable L.  
 The budget constraint of the agent is: 
(7) [ ] GFFwktttc TLwraaTrc +−+−+≤+++ + )1()1(1)1( 1 τττ  
Variable τc is the consumption tax, τk is the tax on capital income and τw  is the tax on 
labor income. Variable TG is the transfer from government to households Tr is the income 
transfer from worker to parents. As I simulate the increase of consumption taxes, the 
consumption expenditures ct becomes an important variable. I assume that skilled 
workers in the formal sector spend all their consumption expenditures on the goods 
produced in the formal sector only and pay consumption taxes. This assumption holds as 
informal sector goods are inferior relative to income due to low production quality. The 
higher the income is, the lesser the choice of consuming informal goods.  
The value function of unskilled workers in the formal and informal sector is: 
(8) [ ]{ }LatVlcuLatV tttlacI ,,1(),(max),,( ,, ++= φ  
 while the budget constraint of the agents is: 
(9) [ ] IIkttttc LwraaTrcc +−+≤++−++ + )1(1)1()1( 1 τθθτ  
Unskilled workers in the formal and informal sector do not pay labor taxes but pay 
capital income taxes because they could only put their assets in formal financial 
institutions. They neither receive the government pension benefits nor participate in the 
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employee’s voluntary fully funded pension program. For unskilled workers in the 
informal sector, most of their wages are very low, lower than the wages of unskilled labor 
in the formal sector. Meanwhile, both type of workers still receive transfers from the 
government. In addition to differences in wages and wages taxes, the consumption 
expenditures of the workers in the informal sector are split into consumption expenditures 
on goods produced in the formal sector and goods produced in the informal sector. 
Parameter θ is a consumption expenditure coefficient with a value between and inclusive 
of 0 and 1. The workers pay consumption taxes when they consume goods produced in 
the formal sector but not when they consume goods produced in the informal sector. 
The first order condition with respect to consumption for skilled labor households 
in the formal sector is given by: 
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The first order condition with respect to consumption for unskilled labor households in 
the formal and informal sectors is given by: 
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The first order condition with respect to leisure for the three types of households is given 
by: 
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Readers can see that, while the first order condition with respect to leisure is the same for 
all types of households, the first order condition with respect of consumption is different. 
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These differences will imply different choices of optimal consumption and leisure, 
respectively. 
The movement of labor from the formal sector to the informal sector, or the other 
way around, takes place as they maximize their value function V (t, a, L): 
(13)  { }),,(),,,(max),,( LatVLatVLatV IF=
 Labor will stay in the formal sector if VF (.) ≥ VI (.). They will stay in the informal sector 
if VF (.) < VI (.). 
 The last agents in the households are the retired agents. They retire at age 55, and 
for simplicity they are assumed to die at age 65. For unskilled labor, either from the 
formal sector or the informal sector, most of the retirees need to work to support 
themselves. They have difficulties generating savings while they are young, since their 
income is only sufficient for the consumption of the family. For skilled labor, there are 
transitions of labor from the government sector and from the private sector after the 
agents retired. McKee (2006) stated that around 50 percent of government employees 
move into either the private sector or self-employment after they retire, while around 61 
percent of private sector workers move into self-employment after they retire. Self-
employment for labor falls in the area of informal sector. Given such conditions, the 
value function for the retired population in Indonesia is: 
(14) [ ]{ }LSatVlcuLSatV ttttlacR ,,,1(),(max),,,( ,, ++= φ  
with a budget constraint defined as : 
(15) [ ] SPLwracc IIkttc +++−+≤−++ )1(1)1()1( τθθτ  
Variable P is the pension benefit they receive from the government (e.g., the 
redistribution benefit), and variable S is their own savings or the fully funded pension of 
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their own. The first order conditions for consumption and leisure of the retired population 
are the same as in equations (11) and (12), respectively. 
 
The Firm Sectors 
The single representative firm in the formal sector maximizes the following profit 
function: 
(16) MpKrLuwuLswsLKFrw mFFFFFFFwFFFLK −+−−−−−=Π )()1(),()1(),(max, δττ
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital, r the interest rate, Fτ  is the corporate income 
tax, and wτ  is the skilled labor income tax. Variable pm is the price of imported 
production material, variable M is the imported amount of production material. The 
unskilled labor income is usually below the taxable amount of labor income. The first 
order conditions with respect to capital,  skilled labor, and unskilled labor give, 
respectively: 
(17) 
F
FFFF rLKF τ
δ
−
+=
1
)(),('1  
(18) 
F
FwFF wstLKF τ−
−=
1
)1(
),('2  
(19) 
F
FFF wuLKF τ−= 1),('3  
The representative firm in the informal sector maximizes the following profit 
function: 
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I assume that the capital is not accumulated in the long run production function in the 
informal sector.  The first order condition for the firm in the informal sector with respect 
to capital is given by: 
(21) II   
II rLKF δ+=),('1
Note that the interest rate and depreciation rate in the informal sector are different from 
the ones in the formal sector. The informal sector interest rate  is higher than the formal 
sector interest rate  due to lending risk in the informal sector, such as weak lending 
contract. The formal and informal capital markets are weakly separated. The capital in 
the formal production sector comes from the formal capital market, while the capital in 
the informal production sector comes from the informal capital market. However, the 
capital might move from the formal capital market to informal capital market. 
Ir
Fr
The first order condition for the representative firm in the informal sector with 
respect to unskilled labor is: 
(22)  I
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For simplification, a penalty for a formal firm wittingly operating in the informal sector is 
not included because law enforcement in Indonesia is weak.  
I also allow the movement of firms from the formal sector to informal sector, or 
the other way around. The movement of firms between sectors is a function of profit 
maximization Π (w, r): 
(23) { }),(),,(max),( rwrwrw IF ΠΠ=Π  
Firms with small to medium size have incentives to move between sectors. They will stay 
in the formal sector as long as ΠF (.) > ΠI (.), and will stay in the informal sector if ΠF (.) 
< ΠI (.). 
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The Pension Sector 
There are two running pension systems in Indonesia right now. The first type is 
the first pillar defined benefit system, but not the pure pay-as-you-go type, as the benefit 
is set by the government without any contribution from employees, since the government 
fully subsidizes the program (Simanjuntak, 2003). The fund for the subsidy is collected 
from central government tax revenue. This type of pension holds only for the civil 
servant and the military. The second type is the third pillar voluntary fully funded defined 
contribution. Rachmatawarta (2004) stated that there are not many employees involved in 
this program. Information regarding the participation rate is unavailable. 
In the simulations related to the first research question, the first pillar defined 
benefit type is financed by the consumption tax for cash transfers for all pensioners. 
Because the cash transfer program is more general and covers all type of workers, the 
plan is expected to replace the current defined benefit plan for the civil servants. The 
second pillar is a fully funded defined contribution savings plan for workers whose level 
of income is sufficient to follow the program. 
The households’ total contribution consumption tax for the first pillar defined 
benefit is defined as: 
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Again, the variable τc is the consumption tax, the variable θ is the fraction of 
consumption of formal sector goods, and the variable Ct is the households’ aggregate 
consumption expenditure.  Note that even though the contribution is different among 
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households, the benefit for any type of household would be the same as it is a lump-sum 
benefit. 
 Meanwhile, the fully funded savings program is defined as: 
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The pension savings S equals the total annuities of fully funded savings contribution 
during work life Ht  , which equals the present value of benefit Bt received when 
individuals retire. 
 
The Government Sector 
The central government receives taxes from consumption taxes.  For Indonesia, 
the value added tax is the largest source of revenue of consumption taxes (27 percent of 
year 2000 central government revenue), followed by sales taxes (8.6 percent of year 2000 
central government revenue). In addition to consumption taxes, capital income taxes in 
2000 shared 34 percent of the total disposable capital income. Meanwhile, the tax on 
labor is very small, only 1.8 percent of the total disposable labor income. This 
demonstrates that the central government is incapable of collecting taxes on labor income. 
 Given these conditions, the modeling for the government revenue and expenditure 
is: 
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Variable D(t) is the government deficit, variable G is the government expenditure, and 
variable TG  is the government transfer to households. The transfer is in terms of 
consumption.  The government deficit is financed by increasing the consumption tax, and 
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so is equal to zero in each period; that is, in the simulation, the consumption tax balances 
the government budget. The Indonesian government bond market has just been developed 
in 2005, and so it is not modeled here. 
 
The Foreign Sector 
The Indonesian economy imports consumption goods and investment goods from 
abroad.  The foreign good is assumed to be a perfect substitute for the domestic 
commodity. Labor is the only non-traded good.  
The trade balance TB is defined as:  
 
(27)  ttttt GICYTB −−−=
 
Meanwhile, the foreign debt   is connected to the net exports TB through this relation:  etB
(28) t  
t
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where is the trade balance discount factor.   gtR
 
The Competitive Equilibrium 
The equilibrium for the economy assumes the following conditions.  
The total labor in the economy is comprised of skilled labor in the formal sector 
LsF, unskilled labor in the formal sector LuF, and unskilled labor in the informal sector 
LuI.  
(29)  IFF LuLuLsL ++=
The total capital in the economy is the sum of capital in the formal sector KF and the 
informal sector KI , or: 
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(30)  IF KKK +=
The initial capital amount for production in the formal production sector is the initial 
capital income divided by interest rate and depreciation rate: 
(31) 00
1 R
r
K
FF δ+=   
Aggregate investment I  in the formal sector is defined as an increment to the capital 
stock Kt, or 
(32) ttt KIK )1(1 δ−+=+  
(Recall that capital does not accumulate in the informal sector.) Meanwhile, the clearing 
price of capital in both markets is:  
(33) Γ+= F  I rr
where Γ is the lending risk in the informal sector. 
The next equations are the marginal conditions for prices in the formal sector.  
First is the interest rate in the formal sector: 
(34) FuF  sFFF
F
F LLKZr δατ ωγα −−= −1)1(
so that the interest rate, as the price of capital, satisfies the marginal condition for capital 
in the formal sector.  (Recall that the interest rate in the informal sector is derived from 
this via equation (33).)  The wage of skilled labor in the formal sector is given by: 
(35) ωγαγτ uFsFFF
w
F
F
s LLKZt
w 1
1
)1( −
−
−=  
so that the wage of skilled labor in the formal sector satisfies the marginal condition for 
labor in the formal sector, as does unskilled labor in the formal sector according to.  
(36) 1  )1( −−= ωγαωτ uFsFFFFFu LLKZw
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Meanwhile, the marginal condition for prices in the informal sector is given as 
(37)  IuIIII LKZr δα ωα −= −1
so that the interest rate, as the price of capital, satisfies the marginal condition for capital 
in the informal sector. Finally, 
(38) 1−  = ωαω uIIIIu LKZw
so that the wage of labor in the informal sector satisfies the marginal condition for labor 
in the informal sector. 
The macroeconomy equilibrium satisfies the fact that Indonesia is a small open 
economy country: 
(39) MXGICY −+++=  
Finally, to satisfy the small open economy assumption, the domestic interest rate r adjusts 
to the international interest rate re in the long run, so that: 
(40) er  r =
Examples of the small open economy dynamic CGE model can be seen at Broer and 
Westerhout (1997), and Broer, Westerhout, and Bovenberg (1994).  
 
The Market Clearing Condition 
As there are movements of labor between sectors, we may conclude that there is a 
market clearing price of labor that adjusts the amount of labor in the two markets. From 
equations (33) and (35), we can define the price of unskilled labor  in the formal 
market as: 
F
uw
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From equations (34) and (35), we can define the price of skilled labor  in the formal 
market: 
F
Sw
(42)  ( ) UFFwFFFFFS L
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γ  
From equations (33) and (34), the optimal amount of skilled and unskilled labor in the  
formal sector is given as: 
(43) 
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Finally, from equations (36) and (37), we can define the price of unskilled labor in the 
informal sector: 
(44) 
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Given the market clearing condition for the unskilled labor in both sectors:  
(45)  IU
F
U w  w =
we can write the optimal amount of unskilled labor in both sectors: 
(46) 
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What can we infer from the market clearing condition? First, from equation (43), there is 
always a certain ratio between the amount of skilled and unskilled labor in the formal 
sector. Second, from equation (46), the ratio of unskilled labor in both sectors is the 
function of the ratio of capital in both sectors. The implication is that taxing capital in the 
formal sector would induce the movement of capital to the informal sector, and also 
would alter the ratio of unskilled labor in both sectors. 
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The Simulation 
After the calibration of the model above, there are two simulations that are done. 
The first simulation is the increase of consumption taxes as a source of finance for a 
defined benefit pension program for retirees. The purpose of this program is to provide a 
minimum physical need for all pensioners. The second simulation is the extension of a 
mandatory fully funded system that links the contribution and the benefit, thereby serving 
as the savings purpose of the pension program.  The purpose of the two simulations is to 
look at the impact of taxation on the amount of labor in the both the formal and informal 
sectors, and the possibility of the extension of the formal sector through the extension of 
the fully funded pension program. As labor is able to move from the formal sector to the 
informal sector and vice versa, the consumption taxes may at some rate drive the 
movement of labor from the informal sector to the formal one, as the taxation changes the 
value function of consumption, leisure, and income. 
For the first simulation with the defined benefit program, I choose the tax on 
consumption since there is no link between the benefit received and the amount of tax 
paid. This is one way to cut the link between the benefit received and the amount of tax 
paid that exists in the payroll taxes. Theoretically, for a defined benefit program, the 
government should not charge a pension tax from employers, as this increases the burden 
on enterprises in term of an increase in the cost of production, or it induces employers 
either to move to the informal sector or to cut-off the amount of hired employees, as 
happened in Brazil (Filho, 2005), China (Yuan and Feng, 2004), and Turkey (Brook and 
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Whitehouse, 2006).2  The government also should not charge the tax on wages of the 
formal workers to finance the first pillar mandatory defined benefit pension plan, as this 
induces workers to move to the informal sector. This also happened in Brazil.   
Another theoretical reason for choosing the consumption tax: it is the only tax 
variable that does not link to the tax of capital and labor, as shown in equation (25) on the 
government revenue. The tax on capital reduces the usage of capital; the tax on labor 
income reduces the labor supply, while the tax on corporate income reduces both labor 
and capital. All of the three taxes, on capital, on labor, and on corporate income, mostly 
take place in the formal sector. Therefore, increasing one of the taxes creates an incentive 
for labor and firms to move to informal sector. The tax on consumption holds generally 
for labor in the formal and informal sector so that there is little incentive for intersectoral 
movement, as long as the tax rate is bearable for taxpayers. Valverde (2006) also suggests 
the use of consumption tax financing for pension plans in countries with a large informal 
labor market. 
The second simulation is the implementation of a mandatory fully funded pension 
program. In the simulation, even though the program holds for the total workers in the 
formal sector, both skilled and unskilled, I assume that not many unskilled laborers 
follow the program as their labor income is not sufficient if they have to pay the fully 
funded program on their own. The rate of participation is set at 10 percent of the wages of 
skilled labor. The justification for the 10 percent rate is that Law No. 11/1969 regarding 
the pension for civil servants stated that the contribution from employees is 4.75 percent. 
                                                 
2 For information, Turkey is a member of OECD countries who runs a three-party pension system with 
formal and informal production and labor markets. 
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I round up the contribution to 5 percent, and assume that the government or the 
employers match another 5 percent of contribution.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
The Program and Data 
 
 
This chapter elaborates on the computer program used to solve the OLG-CGE 
model and the data used to solve the model. The organization of this chapter is as follows. 
I first discuss the computer program used to find solutions for the OLG-CGE model. 
After that, I discuss the data used for the model.  There are three important classifications 
of data. The first is macroeconomy data, the second is microeconomic data on 
consumption, leisure, and interest rates, and the third category is data on population and 
labor markets, including the productivity of labor. Data in all classes are related to 
Indonesia, unless specified as US data for the purpose of comparison.  
 
 
The Program 
To understand how data are chosen, it is important first to understand how the 
program works. The program for overlapping generation computable general equilibrium 
(OLG-CGE) model follows the one written by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). Before the 
year 2001, this program was written in the FORTRAN computer language.  Starting in 
the year 2001, through the generosity of Professor Thomas Rutherford (Rasmussen and 
Rutherford, 2004), scholars who work on OLG modeling are able to write the program in 
GAMS language.3  
                                                 
3 Having written the mathematical OLG model in paper term, I corresponded by e-mail with Professor 
Laurence J. Kotlikoff from Boston University and Professor De Peter Broer from Tilburg University, 
Netherlands, at the end of year 2005. Each person stated that they still write the OLG model in FORTRAN 
computer language. Rasmussen and Rutherford (2004) state that their paper is the first “how to” 
introduction to overlapping generations modeling.  In the paper, they use GAMS instead of FORTRAN. I 
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The OLG-CGE model is a standard theoretical mathematical model (e.g., CES 
intertemporal utility function between consumption and leisure, the theorem of steady-
state, the Keynesian aggregate saving-investment balance). Transferring the model from 
paper to computer does not much change the language. The syntax program for the OLG 
model in the computer is also a theoretical mathematical one. One of the characteristics 
of the theoretical model is its generality, valid for every economic structure. The 
implication is that, applying the model from one economy to another needs only change 
the data without changing the program, assuming the programmer has the same purpose 
for the model application. 
There are three types of basic OLG-CGE modeling. The first and the simplest one 
is the OLG Exchange model. A second and more complex one is the OLG Bequest model.  
The third type of model, and the one that I apply here, is the OLG Production model. The 
three OLG models could be mixed one into another according to necessity. For 
elaboration of each model, see Rasmussen and Rutherford (2004). 
The fundamental of the mathematical OLG program is the intertemporal 
macroeconomy model. In the model, the variables consumption, leisure, and interest rates 
play an essential role. Consumption and leisure generate the intertemporal utility function 
of the individuals in the model. The interest rate functions as the relative price of present 
and future consumption.  Since the OLG model is a dynamic one, there is also the 
variable time in the model. Time is set annually and separated into consumption and 
leisure. In addition, variable assets are included as an exchange for consumption before 
                                                                                                                                                 
myself find that writing the OLG-CGE model in GAMS program is much more user friendly than writing it 
in FORTRAN. 
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the individual is working, and therefore one is able to consume from the beginning of 
one’s time at age 21, after one’s retirement at age 55, and to the end of time at age 65.  
The basic OLG production model has five steps in the construction of model 
blocks. The first step is the set building for generation indexes, time periods, and life-
cycle. The second step consists of the construction of the benchmark steady-state of 
reference generation. The replication of the second step for every generation by mapping 
each variable to every generation follows in the third step. After that, the redistribution of 
assets as a benchmark of assets holding is completed in the fourth step. Finally, the fifth 
step consists of the building of the macroeconomy block. A calibration procedure is 
processed after each step is completed. The GAMS program applies the Newton iteration 
method for calibration. 
 
Data for the Production Model 
The starting point for the development of any CGE model, either static or 
dynamic, is the construction of a macroeconomic but microeconomic-consistent 
benchmark data set. Since the pioneering work of Pyatt and Thorbecke, the benchmark 
dataset for a CGE model is specified in the form of social accounting matrix (Davies, 
2004). 
Data for the OLG-CGE Production model comprise benchmark macroeconomy 
data, the population set, fundamental parameters, the productivity index, and a labor 
condition. Below is the elaboration for each category. All data are set starting from year 
2000 because this is the year for the latest data released of the Indonesia social 
accounting matrix. I also set year 2000 as the benchmark time for all benchmark data 
 
63 
 
collected. The consequence is the initial steady-state condition in the model starts from 
the year 2000. 
 
The Benchmark Macroeconomy Data 
 
The Indonesian open macroeconomy data for year 2000 can be seen at Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Indonesia: The Summary of Year 2000 Macroeconomy Outlook  
(Trillion Rupiah) 
 Output Income Expenditure Total 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
1     937.5 233.7 115.7 569.5 1,856.4 
2 725.9           725.9 
3 642.2           642.2 
4  184.2  11.3         195.5 
5  541.7 630.9    72.6  1,245.2 
6     307.7   7.2  (81.2)    233.7 
7    195.5        195.5 
8 488.3           488.3 
 
Total 
 
1,856.4 
 
725.9 
 
642.2 
 
195.5 
 
1,245.2 
 
233.7 
 
195.5 
 
  488.3 
 
 
5,582.7 
Notes: 1 = Output, 2 = Value Added on Capital, 3 = Value Added on Labor, 4 = Tax Revenue,                       
5 = Private Consumption, 6 = Investment, 7 = Government Expenditure, 8 = Rest of the World  
Source: "Sistem Neraca Sosial Ekonomi Indonesia 2000" (2003), modified by Widjaja. 
 
Here are the lists of benchmark macroeconomy data for Indonesian economy, taken from 
the macroeconomy data in Table 5.1. The matrix itself is the summary of Indonesian year 
2000 social accounting matrix.4 Later on, the figures will be replicated and developed in 
the CGE model through generations. Figures are in year 2000 rupiah trillion, except for 
the benchmark tax rates. 
 
C0   benchmark private consumption      937.5 
I0   benchmark investment       233.7 
G0   benchmark government consumption       115.7 
X0   benchmark exports        569.5 
                                                 
4 The actual Y2000 Indonesia social accounting matrix comprises of three size categories. The largest one 
is 110 rows * 110 columns. The medium size is 38 rows * 38 columns. The smallest one is 13 rows * 13 
columns. The matrix in this paper is summarized from the smallest social accounting matrix. 
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M0   benchmark imports       488.3 
R0   benchmark capital earnings (net of tax)     541.7 
L0   benchmark labor earning (net of tax)     630.9 
S0   benchmark savings        307.7 
T0   benchmark government transfers to households      72.6 
D0   benchmark government budget deficit           -      7.2    
B0   benchmark trade deficit                         -     81.2 
Y0   benchmark output                           1,368.1 
K0       benchmark capital stock     864.0    
TR0   benchmark tax rate on capital income                    0.34 
TL0   benchmark tax rate on labor income                     0.018 
  
 
Benchmark output Y0, Rp.1,368.1 trillion, is the sum of value added on capital (Rp. 
725.9 trillion) and value added on labor (Rp. 642.2 trillion). The figure is then broken 
down into the tax on capital (Rp. 184.2 trillion), the benchmark capital earnings R0 (Rp. 
541,7 trillion), the tax on labor (Rp. 11.3 trillion), and the benchmark labor earnings L0 
(Rp. 630.9 trillion).  
The sum of the tax on capital and the tax on labor equals the government tax 
revenue (Rp. 195.5 trillion). This figure, after distributed into government consumption 
G0 (Rp. 115.7 trillion) and government transfers T0 (Rp. 72.6 trillion), becomes 
government budget surplus or negative government deficit D0 (Rp. 7.2 trillion). 
The benchmark government consumption G0 (Rp. 115.7 trillion) is the sum of 
government expenditures, and consists of four items. Those items are intra-government 
transfers, government expenditure on domestic goods, government expenditure on 
imported goods, and interest payments on foreign loan (not shown in the matrix).  
The benchmark private consumption C0 (Rp. 937.5 trillion) is the total household 
expenditures, comprising four items: transfers among households, household expenditure 
on domestic goods, household expenditure on imported goods, and household transfers 
abroad (not shown in the matrix). 
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 The counterpart of the benchmark consumption is the benchmark savings S0 (Rp. 
307.7 trillion), which is the sum of take home labor earnings (Rp. 541.7 trillion), take 
home capital earnings (Rp. 630.9 trillion), and government transfers to households T0 
(Rp. 72.6 trillion), subtracted by benchmark private consumption C0 (Rp. 937.5 trillion).  
For the open economy data, the benchmark trade deficit B0 is negative, or Rp. 
81.2 trillion in year 2000, as the value of exports X0 (Rp. 569.5 trillion) is larger than 
imports M0 (Rp. 488.3 trillion). Indonesia experienced a surplus in its current account in 
that year.  
For domestic data, benchmark investment I0 (Rp. 214.1 trillion) is equal to the 
sum of benchmark savings S0 and the government budget deficit D0. Links among the 
three variables satisfy the savings-investment balance relationship. 
Another important variable is the benchmark capital stock K0. For a developing 
country like Indonesia, some economic data do not exist. The data on the capital stock is 
no exception. Some researchers from the Bank of Indonesia, the Indonesian Central Bank, 
have tried to estimate the capital stock for Indonesia. Wicaksono, Ariantoro, and Sari 
(2002) estimated the capital stock of Indonesia by using a perpetual inventory method 
and comparing the gross estimation result with the net one. The result of their simulation 
is in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. Indonesia: The Estimation of the Capital Stock (Year 2000, Trillion Rupiah) 
Gross Capital Stock Net Capital Stock 
 Australian Method 
(Discard Function) 
Netherlands Method 
(Survival Function) 
1,939.8 1,236.5 1,336.9 
Source:  Wicaksono, Ariantoro, and Sari (2002) 
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Still, the estimation result in Table 7  is under debate.5  
 I follow the Auerbach and Kotlikoff calculation method. Their calculation method 
is that the benchmark capital stock K0 is equal to the ratio of benchmark capital earnings 
divided by the sum of the periodic interest rate and the periodic depreciation rate. The 
result for K0 is Rp. 864 trillion. 
Still following Auerbach and Kotlikoff, the data for the benchmark tax rate on 
capital income TR0 is set from the tax effort data (e.g., the ratio of tax revenue over the 
tax base) on capital. The figure reached as high as 34 percent (or 184.2/541.7) in year 
2000. Similarly, the benchmark tax rate on labor income TL0 is the tax effort on labor, 
and is low, only 1.8 percent. These calculations show that there is a lot more effort to be 
done to increase the tax revenue from labor income, including the pension tax. At the end 
of Chapter Five, I elaborate benchmark labor data, to get a better picture for why the tax 
effort on labor income in Indonesia is so low.  
 
The Population Set 
The population set comprises time interval, life cycle, and generation. The time 
interval is set at a 5-year cycle for each period in order to catch the long run impact of 
pension policy without having too many unimportant details. Again, year 0 in the model 
is year 2000. The “existence” of people in the model begins at age 21 where people enter 
the labor market. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
the life expectancy for Indonesia reached age 65.6 in year 2000. Therefore, in order to 
construct the model close to the factual, the life cycle is set from 0 to 40, meaning that 
                                                 
5 There is also a work in progress by Van der Eng (n.d.) from Australia National University on the 
estimation of the Indonesia capital stock. Unfortunately, the Van der Eng requested that the paper not be 
quoted, as it is not finished yet. 
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people “die” at age 65. The calculation of the maximum age in the model is the initial age 
(20) plus the maximum amount of age point in the life-cycle (9) multiplied by the time 
interval (5). Currently, pensions for civil servants start at age 56 in Indonesia. The time 
period is set from year 0 to year 120.  
Generation is set from the initial year for the oldest generation born at age (-40), 
to the end of the observed time period at time 120. Therefore, there are four generations 
in the model, starting from time (-40) to time 0, from time 0 to time 40, from time 40 to 
time 80, and from time 80 to time 120.  
 
The Fundamental Parameters6  
There are eight required fundamental parameters, and the way each datum is 
collected is different one from another. The data comprise the annual interest rate, the 
annual population growth rate, the annual depreciation rate, the intertemporal elasticity, 
the elasticity of substitution between consumption versus leisure, the consumption share 
parameters, the elasticity of transformation between domestic goods versus exports, and 
the Armington elasticity.  The next paragraphs discuss how these parameters are chosen. 
  
Annual interest rate. The annual real interest rate is calculated at 7 percent for Indonesia. 
The value is 5 percent for US case. The formula for the real interest rate is  
(30) ra = (1- τ) i - πc  
 
 
where  ra  =  real interest rate 
 
            τ  =  consumption tax rate, set at 10 percent 
 
                                                 
6 Fundamental parameters are required parameters in order for the OLG-CGE simultaneous equation 
system to work well. See Rasmussen and Rutherford (2004) for more information. 
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            i   =  nominal interest rate for consumption credit (20 percent in Y 2000)  
 
           πc  =  inflation rate at the food sector  (11 percent in Y 2000). 
 
Source: "Indonesian Financial  Statistics" (various) 
  
The annual interest rate is developed as the periodic interest rate by the following formula:  
(31) r = (1+ ra) T -1   
 
where  r = periodic interest rate 
            
T = time interval.  
 
Population growth rate. Data for the Indonesian annual population growth rate is taken 
from the United Nations population projection. The year 2000 annual population growth 
rate is 1.26 percent. See Table 8. 
 
Table 8. Indonesia: The Annual Periodic Population Growth Rate (percent) 
2000-
2005 
2005-
2010 
2010-
2015 
2015-
2020 
2020-
2025 
1.37 1.30 1.21 1.09 0.94 
Source:  Population projection 2000-2050 
 
I calculate the periodic population growth rate γ by the following formula:  
(32) γ = (1+ 0.01) T -1        
 
Rasmussen and Rutherford set the US annual population growth rate at 1 percent. They 
do not set the aging phenomenon into the model. 
 
Annual depreciation rate. The macroeconomy data for the annual depreciation rate of 
capital are shown in Table 9, where I present the Indonesian macroeconomy annual 
depreciation rate.  
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Table 9. Indonesia: The Annual Macroeconomy Depreciation Rate  
Year (a) 
Depreciation  
(Current Prices, 
Trillion Rp) 
(b) 
GDP 
(Current 
Prices, 
Trillion Rp) 
(a/b) 
Average 
Depreciation 
Rate  
(percent) 
1990 9.8 195. 6 5.0 
1991           11.4  227. 4 5.0 
1992          13. 0 259. 9 5.0 
1993          16. 5 329. 8 5.0 
1994          19. 1 382. 2 5.0 
1995          22. 7 454. 5 5.0 
1996          26. 6 532. 6 5.0 
1997          31. 4 627. 7 5.0 
1998          47. 8 955. 7 5.0 
1999          55. 0     1 099. 7 5.0 
2000          63. 2     1 264. 9 5.0 
2001          73. 4     1 467. 6 5.0 
2002          80. 9     1 619. 1  5.0 
Source: "Statistik Enam Puluh Tahun Indonesia Merdeka"  
 
These data are calculated as a comparison for the annual depreciation rate of capital in 
the model.  The actual annual depreciation rate for Indonesia is 5 percent on average. 
Given the (initial) steady state condition7  
(33) δγ
δ
+
+= r
I
R          
together with the assumptions that r = 0.07, γ = 0.01, δ = 0.05, the benchmark 
macroeconomy data above, the ratio of the after-tax capital earning R to investment level 
I equal to 2.0, then in order to fit the steady-state condition, the actual value of 
investment level I must be modified. This annual depreciation rate itself is then 
developed into periodic depreciation rate by the following formula: 
 
(34) δ = 1 – (1- δa ) T        
    
 
                                                 
7 Please see Rasmussen and Rutherford (2004) for derivation of the formula 
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where δa,and  δ is the annual and periodic depreciation rates, respectively.  
 
 For the US case, Rasmussen and Rutherford set first the value of  r, γ, and δ. The 
value of δ was set at 7 percent. After that, they modified the value of investment I to fit 
the steady-state condition.  
 
Inverse intertemporal elasticity. There are no available data for the Indonesia inverse 
inter-temporal elasticity. I try to find the value by doing some econometric estimation,  
following the work of Mankiw (1985) for US data. Auerbach and Kotlikoff put the values 
of the intertemporal elasticity estimated from the work of Mankiw. The figure ranges 
from -0.23 to -0.37. They chose 0.25 as the intertemporal elasticity value, with an implied 
inverse of 4. 
 My econometric work used the OLS method, and finds the value of alpha, the 
inter-temporal elasticity as -0.1881 (Table 10). This means that the inverse inter-temporal 
elasticity (1/alpha) for Indonesia reached 5.3 for the upper benchmark figure. The OLS 
model specification is shown in Table 10. 
 
Table 10. Indonesia: The OLS Estimation of Intertemporal Elasticity  
Year 1983-2004 
(35) ( ) 1,1,01 )log(/1/log +++ ++= tCtCtt RaCC ηα  
 
where:  
 ( tt CC /log 1+ )= the growth rate of annual consumption 
 
CC iR πτ −−+= )1(1  = one plus the after-tax real interest rate measured in terms of non- 
  durable goods, which is the relative price of consumption today     
  versus consumption tomorrow.  
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 Coeficient t-stat Prob-t 
0a    0.4365      6.685 0.000 
α/1  -0.1881 -5.763 0.000 
    
F(  1,    20)  =   33.21 
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
R-squared        =  0.6241 
Adj R-squared =  0.6053 
Source : Widjaja’s STATA estimation  
 
 
The model equation is actually the Euler condition of the relative price of the current and 
future consumption, derived from the log utility of intertemporal consumption function 
Mankiw (1985). The relative price is the after tax real interest rate. The data for the 
annual growth rate of consumption are calculated from the annual data of macroeconomy 
aggregate consumption, issued by the Central Board of Statistics, while the data for the 
interest rate are the ones issued by Bank Indonesia. 
  The estimation result shows an R-squared 0.6241, meaning that the model does 
not perfectly explain the movement of inter-temporal consumption function. Still, the 
estimation of the explanatory variables shows a good result. The t-statistic for 1/α is -
5.763 with probability 0.000, which suggests that the after tax real interest rate as a 
relative price is a good explanatory variable. Starting from the upper benchmark value 
5.3, I put the value one by one (5.3, 5.2, 5.1, 5.0, 4.9, etc.), and get the optimal value for 
Indonesia  at 4.0. 
 
Elasticity of substitution. The elasticity of substitution (σ) between consumption versus 
leisure ranges from 0.1 to 1. The value for the US case is chosen at 0.8. The elasticity is 
useful to find the CES power between consumption function and leisure (ρ). I put the 
values into the model one by one (0.8, 0.7, 0.6, etc.), and find that 0.4 is the optimal value 
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for the Indonesia elasticity of substitution. The relationship between the two variables is 
defined as:  
(36) ρ = 1- 1/ σ        
  
 
Consumption share parameter. Auerbach and Kotlikoff set the value 0.4 for the US 
consumption share parameter. They assumed that people work 2000 hours a year (40 
hours per week) from 5000 hours available per year. It is assumed that the income from 
total working hours multiplied by wages equal consumption. For the case of Indonesia, I 
chose the consumption share parameter around the value of 0.4. 
 
Elasticity of transformation. The elasticity of transformation of resources between 
domestic versus exports is taken from the work of Robinson, Said, and San (1997).  By 
using a static CGE model, they try to observe the impact of the economic crisis on the 
Indonesian rice market. They calculated that for the case of Indonesia, the elasticity of 
transformation ranges from 0.5 to 2.0, depending on the economic sector. I set the figure 
at 1.2 from the value of the agricultural sector elasticity of transformation that dominates 
the Indonesian economy. For the US case, the value is chosen at 4.0. 
 
Armington elasticity. The Armington elasticity parameter measures the effect of the 
changes of landed (tariff inclusive) prices of imported goods on the price of the same 
domestically produced goods (Warr, forthcoming).  Leith, Porter, and Warr (2003), by 
using a static CGE model in the work on Indonesian rice commodity and tariff, estimated 
that the Armington elasticity on imports for Indonesia ranges from 2.0 to 10.0. I choose 
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the lowest figure since that is the value that fits the Indonesian model. For the US case, 
the chosen value is 4.0. 
 
 
The Benchmark Labor Data 
 
The labor data are taken from the Statistics of Labor Force in Indonesia, published 
by the Indonesian Central Board of Statistics. The summary for Indonesia labor force 
condition is presented in Table 11. In total, there are 90.79 million people in the 
Indonesian labor force. This amount is around 44 percent of the total Indonesian 
population in year 2000 (205.8 million people). 
 
 
Table 11. Indonesia: The Composition of Labor Force  
(Year 2000, Million People) 
  Skilled 
 
Unskilled 
 
 Total 
 
 
Formal 
Absolute 
 
3.46 
 
28.21 
 
31.67 
 
(Percent) 
 
(3.9) (31.1) (35.0) 
 
Informal 
Absolute 
 
0.52 
 
58.60 
 
59.12 
 
(Percent) 
 
(0.5) (64.5) (65.0) 
 
Total 
Absolute 3.98 86.81 
 
90.79 
 
(Percent) (4.4) (95.6) (100) 
Source: "Laborer/Employees Situation in Indonesia" (various) 
 
 
The composition of the Indonesian labor force is as follows: there are 3.98 million 
people of skilled labor (4.4 percent of total labor in Indonesia) and 86.81 million people 
of unskilled labor (95.6 percent of total labor). I define skilled labor as people in the 
working force who finished their college and university education. Unskilled labor is 
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defined as people in the working force who finished only their high school education or 
lower. 
Most of skilled labor is able to work in the formal sector, or 3.46 million people. 
In total there are 31.67 million people in the formal sector, or 35 percent of total labor. 
The other 65.0 percent or 59.12 million people work in the informal sector. I define 
formal production sector as employers who employ paid labor and employees who work 
as paid labor. Informal production sector is defined as the self-employed, as employers 
who employ unpaid labor, and as employees who work as unpaid labor. The definition of 
paid and unpaid is whether there exists a contract between employers and employees. 
Table 11 also indicates that there are 0.52 million people of skilled labor in the informal 
sector. In the model construction in Chapter Four, I ignore the role of skilled labor in the 
informal sector because the portion is small, only 0.5 percent of total Indonesian labor. 
From the Book of Year 2000 Indonesia Social Accounting Matrix, the average 
amount of wages and salary reached Rp 9.9 million in the formal sector and Rp. 4.6 
million in the informal sector. From that information, I calculate the ratio of wages and 
salary between formal and informal sector as 2.2:1. In terms of the time efficiency 
amount, the average labor wages and salary in year 2000 reached Rp. 8.9 million in the 
formal sector and Rp. 4.9 million in the informal sector. The ratio between the two was 
1.8:1. However, from the calibration result, the ratio between the two cannot be inferred 
since the results for both prices of labor start from 100 percent and then decline at the 
same rate.8  
                                                 
8 This is an example of one of the features of using the CGE model. The model is very rigid in the 
presentation of results and the growth of variables, following the parameter set-up in the model.  
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 In Table 12, I do an econometric estimation to observe the relation between 
skilled labor and government expenditure, following the work of Verbina and Cowdhury 
(2002). It is assume that the annual amount of college and university students is a 
function of the population, the income of the family (measured here by GDP per capita), 
and the government education expenditure.   
 
Table 12. Indonesia: The OLS Estimation of Elasticity of Government Education   
Expenditure  to Skilled Labor Creation 1983-2004 
 
(37) ttttt xxxy εβββ +++= 332211 lnlnlnln   
 
where:  
tyln  = the logarithm of the annual amount of college and university student 
tx1ln  = the logarithm of annual government education expenditure (billion Rp.) 
tx2ln = the logarithm of annual number of population 
tx3ln = the logarithm of annual GDP per capita 
 
 
 Coefficient t-stat Prob-t 
β1   0.296      3.40    0.003        
β2   0.987      18.92    0.000      
β3   0.166     2.27 0.035 
F(  3,    19)  =   82444.53 
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
R-squared        =  0.9999 
Adj R-squared =  0.9999 
Source: Widjaja’s STATA estimation  
  
 
In Table 12, I estimate that the elasticity of government budget of skilled labor creation 
reached 0.296. This means that for every 100 percent increase of government expenditure 
on education, there is a 29.6 percent increase of college and university students generated 
from the government education expenditure. 
The high value of the R-squared (0.99) shows that the model is a good one to 
explain the dependent variable. Also, the t-statistics for each independent variable are 
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very significant. The t-statistic for government expenditure is 3.40 with probability 0.003, 
the t-statistic for population is 18.92 with probability 0.000, and the t-statistic for GDP 
per capita is 2.27 with probability 0.035. 
 
 
The Productivity Index 
 
The final estimation is for the productivity index. The model is the same as the 
one used in Auerbach and Kotlikoff, who followed the estimation obtained by Welch 
(1979). The estimation model is in Table 13.  
 
Table 13. Indonesia: The OLS Estimation of the Labor Productivity Index 
(Year 2000 Cross-Section Raw Data) 
 
(38)  iiiii thxxy εδγββα +++++= 21211ln
 
where:  
 
iyln  = the logarithm of weekly labor earnings of full-time workers 
ix1     = experience 
2
1ix     = squared of experience  
ih      = weekly working hours 
 t       = time trend 
 
 Coeficient t-stat Prob-t 
Α 8.4493 391.024 0.000 
β1 0.1128 106.697 0.000 
β2              - 0.0012 -90.750 0.000 
Γ 0.0305 118.282 0.000 
Δ 0.2177 219.224 0.000 
F(  4,114676) = 21735.35 
Prob > F         =  0.0000 
r-squared        =  0.4312 
Adj r-squared =  0.4312 
Source : Widjaja’s STATA estimation  
 
The low r-squared value 0.4312 indicates that the model of Indonesian labor productivity 
index above is not a strong one. However, the two important parameters, β1 and β2 , are 
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good estimators for the experience variables. Their t-statistic are high, and their 
probability is 0.000. 
The productivity index equation can then be written as: 
(39) PI(A) = Exp( 8.4493 + 0.1128*Age(A) - 0.0012*(Age(A)**2) / Exp(8.4493)  
 
where  
 
PI   = Productivity Index 
           A     = Age 
           Exp = Exponential anti-log function 
The productivity index measures the productivity of labor according to age and wages. 
Again, it is a linear combination between skilled and unskilled labor in the formal sector 
only. Wages become the measure of productivity here, and are treated as the dependent 
variable. Readers may see that the productivity index is positively related to age, A, but 
negatively related to the square of age, A2, which means that the production capacity of 
laborers increases at the beginning and reaches its peak at certain age (age 47) before 
going down until they retire.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
The Analysis of Sources of Financing 
 
 
This chapter covers the analysis of ways the Indonesian government finances the 
pension program. As has been noted in Chapter Three, the program is a program that 
combines redistribution via a defined benefit type and a fully-funded defined contribution 
type. The redistribution program is intended to eliminate poverty among older people as 
well as to create an incentive for young individuals to save for their own future in the 
fully funded program. In this case, the redistribution program is financed through 
government budget.   The savings purpose of the fully funded program may be financed 
by the individuals and by the institution where they work. In this chapter, I analyze how 
the Indonesian government should finance these programs.  
 
Redistribution program. For the distribution program, there are three options of 
financing source to be made.  Those options are to fund from corporate income taxes, 
from labor income taxes, and from consumption taxes. Based on several criteria, such as 
easiness to administer, sufficiency, sustainability, and excess burden, the choice falls on 
consumption taxes.  
 The government has two alternatives regarding the time of transferring the 
redistribution program. Those disbursement times are ex-ante retirement and ex-post 
retirement (Geanakoplos, Mitchell, and Zeldes, 1998). In the ex-ante retirement 
alternative, the government puts the funds in the worker’s account every month during 
the working time of the worker. In term of incentives, ex-ante financing is preferable for 
workers.  The ex-post retirement financing means that the government disburses the fund 
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to the retiree after they are retired. In terms of budget feasibility for the government, ex-
post disbursement is preferable to ex-ante retirement. In doing the analysis, I assume that 
the Indonesian government chooses ex-post disbursement9 The benefits for every 
pensioner are set equal across pensioners irrespective of how much they have contributed 
through the consumption tax. This type of benefit is known as a flat benefit.  
 
Fully funded program. The fully funded program is the actual pension program that I 
examine for the long run of the model. I expect that, as labor becomes more educated, the 
wages of labor become sufficiently high that laborers are able to self-finance their own 
pension. As more people get involved in the fully funded savings program, the central 
government is able to release the burden of cash transfers for minimum pension. For the 
fully funded savings pension program, since it has a strong connection between 
contributions and benefits, the financing is taken from the earmarked taxes on labor 
income. The benefit received from this program depends on the contribution of each 
person into their pension account.  
  
The Financing of the Redistribution Program 
The redistribution program is financed from the three sources of tax choices: 
corporate income taxes, labor income taxes, and consumption taxes. Included in the 
consumption tax is a value added tax, an excise tax, and a tax on luxurious goods.  Since 
this is a redistribution defined benefit program, the source of financing does not have to 
                                                 
9 Actually, if the government does not allow the retiree to disburse the pension fund before they retire, the 
ex-ante financing system can be transferred to the ex-post financing system.  
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be taxed from earmarked taxes, i.e., labor income. Before we proceed, let us see the 
pension necessity of retirees (Table 14). 
 
 
Table 14. Indonesia: The Redistribution Financing Need Year 2000-2050 
Year 
Population 
Amount Annual Benefit Provision (billion Rp) 
 Age 60+ World Bank Poverty Measures Indonesia Poverty Lines 
 (million people) USD 1/day USD 2/day USD 3/day 
At  
50 percent 
At 
100 percent 
At 
150 percent 
2000 16.2 58.3 116.6 175.0 9.7 19.4 29.2 
2005 18.6 67.0 133.9 200.9 16.7 33.5 50.2 
2010 20.9 75.2 150.5 225.7 25.1 50.2 75.2 
2015 24.4 87.8 175.7 263.5 36.6 73.2 109.8 
2020 29.2 105.1 210.2 315.4 52.6 105.1 157.7 
2025 34.6 124.6 249.1 373.7 72.7 145.3 218.0 
2030 41.3 148.7 297.4 446.0 99.1 198.2 297.4 
2035 48.3 173.9 347.8 521.6 130.4 260.8 391.2 
2040 55.5 199.8 399.6 599.4 166.5 333.0 499.5 
2045 62.2 223.9 447.8 671.8 205.3 410.5 615.8 
2050 67.4 242.6 485.3 727.9 242.6 485.3 727.9 
Source:  a. "World population prospects: The 2006 revision population database 
b.  Maksum (n.d.) 
Note:  It is assumed that USD 1 = Rp. 10.000. 
           According to Central of Board Statistics calculation, the poverty lines increases by Rp 50.000 for 
every 5 years in 1999-2004, and this amount becomes the basis for inflation adjustment 
calculation in the table above.  
 
Table 14 shows two alternative ways of calculating annual benefit provision for 
the cash transfer program. The first one is calculated from the World Bank’s 
measurement of poverty, and the second one is calculated from the Indonesian Central 
Board of Statistics poverty line. The benefit calculation according to the Indonesian 
poverty line is low at the beginning, and the amount is lower than the benefit calculation 
from the World Bank’s poverty measures. Later on, the benefit calculation according to 
Indonesian poverty lines increases gradually as the amount is adjusted to the inflation rate 
at Rp. 10.000 annually, or USD 1 per year.  
 
81 
 
The World Bank’s measures of poverty are based on the daily income level, and 
the minimum amount at this time is USD 1 per day. I offer three alternative levels of 
benefit provision. In Table 6.1, the benefit USD 3 per day is the highest benefit that 
satisfies personal daily physical need. The amount USD 2 per day provides a minimum 
personal benefit, while USD 1 per day is below the necessity. Still, the benefit USD 1 per 
day is acceptable as part of the benefit since this benefit supports the benefit received 
from the fully funded system. Unlike the benefit calculation based on the Indonesian 
poverty line, the benefit calculation is kept constant for the whole year. For the first year, 
the amount provided to support USD 1 per day person is Rp 58.3 billion. This is the 
lowest amount for the first year according to the World Bank measures. However, this 
amount is still higher than the highest figure according to the poverty line measurement 
of the Indonesian Central Board of Statistics. For the source of financing, the choice of 
tax base is listed in Table 15. The amount is matched to the necessity from the first year.  
 
Table 15. Indonesia: The Redistribution Financing Need Year 2000 (billion Rp.) 
Tax Base Base amount Current tax 
revenue 
(CTR) 
% from the 
base 
CTR + 
minimum 
social security 
amount 
% from the 
base 
Corporate 
Income 
391.1 184.2 47.1 242.5 61.9 
Labor Income 641.8 11.4 1.8 69.7 10.8 
Consumption 
Taxes 
937.5 69.9 7.5 128.2 13.7 
Source: "Sistem Neraca Sosial Ekonomi Indonesia 2000," 2003, calculated by Widjaja. 
 
 
Again, there are three choices of the source of financing for social security 
redistribution purpose: corporate income, labor income, and consumption taxes. For 
 
82 
 
simulation purposes, the minimum amount of the social security benefit is added on top 
of the taxed amount. 
 Corporate income is the current most accessible source of taxes for the central 
government.  The problem is that the current tax amount is already quite high, or 47 
percent of the tax base. Adding the social security taxes on top of that creates a very high 
tax burden for firms in the private sector, and many firms might leave from the business 
sector or move to the informal business sector. Sustainability of social security taxes from 
this source is also not certain. 
 Labor income is the most difficult tax source for the central government to access. 
From the year 2000 social accounting matrix, the tax effort from labor income reached 
only 1.8 percent, less than 2 percent (Table 15). From the labor data in Chapter Five, 
roughly 65 percent of Indonesian laborers work in the informal sector, a sector that is 
largely excluded from government taxes. We also know that the informal goods sector is 
predicted to contribute to Indonesian GDP by 25 percent (Charmes, 2000). If the 
prediction regarding the GDP share of formal and informal sector is true, then the social 
security benefit would be sustainable if the government wa able to increase the base up to 
70 percent of the total labor income. Adding the social security tax on top of year 2000 
labor income tax increases the total tax effort into 10.8 percent.  
However, there are problems with labor income taxation for redistribution. As the 
benefit may be relatively lower than the contributions, workers may want to move from 
the formal sector to the informal sector to avoid the taxes.  As has already been discussed 
in the model construction in Chapter Four, the increase of wage taxes may reduce the 
value function of workers in the formal sector. If workers think that their value function 
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in the formal sector becomes lower than their value function in the informal sector, then 
they will move to the informal sector. The second problem with this tax source is that 
many workers’ monthly salaries are too low, only sufficient to satisfy their physical needs 
without an additional premium to pay the taxes. The third problem arising from taxing 
labor income is that self-employed workers tend not to pay the additional social security 
taxes, as happened in the application of pay-as-you-go system in both the developed and 
developing countries applying the system.  
The last source of taxes is consumption taxes. While the tax effort is fairly high, 
amounting to 7.5 percent of the consumption base, there are still some parts of the 
consumption base that fall in the informal goods production sector. It is not known how 
large is the consumption share of goods produced by the informal sector firms. Using 
Charmes (2000) prediction, I assume that the consumption of the goods produced in the 
formal sector reaches 75 percent of the Indonesian total consumption. This explains why 
the consumption tax base can still be increased. Adding the social security tax into the 
current tax revenue increases the tax effort into 13.7 percent. From the tax base amount, 
consumption taxes are predicted also as a sustainable source for the social security taxes 
and a relatively easy source of taxes to administer. Last, consumption taxes as the source 
of redistribution for social security have its own merit as a growth multiplier. The tax 
amount distributed to the retirees is partially being consumed directly, returning some 
part of the taxes to the economy. In turn, this multiplier effect will slightly decrease the 
tax effort ratio as the total amount of indirect tax base (in terms of consumption) 
increases.  
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 Having reviewed all of the choices above, I conclude that consumption tax is the 
best choice among the three to be chosen as the tax base to serve the redistribution 
purpose of the social security program. 
 
The Financing of the Savings Program 
Since the savings program has a strong link between benefits and contributions, 
tax financing should be applicable on the labor income tax base. Therefore, the 
candidates for tax base are the corporate income and the labor income. The policy 
choices are either that the government charges 100 percent taxes on labor income or that 
is uses some combination of corporate income and labor income (50-50 percent) taxes. I 
assume the amount is 10 percent of the labor income. As has already been stated in 
Chapter Four, the amount of 10 percent is based on Law No. 11/1969 regarding the 
pension of civil servants. The Law states that civil servants pay 4.75 percent of their 
salary for the pension savings. I round up of this share to 5 percent, and then assume that 
the company or the central government matches the same amount of the 5 percent tax to 
the individual’s pension account. From the social accounting matrix, it can be calculated 
that the average monthly labor income of skilled labor is Rp. 5 million. Ten percent of the 
income amount is Rp 500 thousand and 5 percent is Rp 250 thousand, which are then 
assumed to be affordable for a skilled labor in Indonesia; that is, saving Rp. 500 thousand 
monthly for 35 years will be sufficient for one person to have a decent living when retire. 
As I already have reviewed, there are some advantages and disadvantages for 
each type of taxes. Due to a strong link between benefits and contributions for a fully 
funded savings pension program, I expect that there will be little movement of labor from 
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the formal sector to the informal sector after labor income taxation, especially for labor 
whose wages are at the margin between the two sectors. The detailed analysis is shown in 
Chapter Eight. 
 
 
The Redistribution Issue 
In the pay-as-you-go mandatory pension system, the redistribution of assets 
across cohorts (intergenerational redistribution) and the redistribution of assets within 
cohorts (intragenerational redistribution) takes place as the benefits are received and the 
taxes are paid by different individuals in different generations.  As a consequence, the 
present value of the amount of taxes paid and the amount of benefits received will be 
different. The current tax rate and the future tax rate may or may not be the same. In 
order to calculate the intragenerational redistribution as well as the intergenerational 
redistribution, the pension taxes should be the type of earmarked taxes, i.e., taxes and 
transfer payments that can be traced to the individual. 
 This is, however, not the case for a fully funded mandatory system. In such a 
pension system, the pension is paid by taxpayers for themselves in the future, and the 
present value of taxes and benefits received will only differ if the rate of return on 
investment of the fund received from taxes is differ from the annual discount rate (i.e., 
inflation rate). The rate of return may be higher or lower than the discount rate. As an 
expectation value, in the long run both rates are expected to be equal, although in fact in 
many cases the fund manager is able to generate future profits from the pension fund. 
Therefore, the expected value of return on investment from the fully funded mandatory 
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system is assumed to be zero, and there is no redistribution in the system because the 
taxes paid are returned to the same individual in term of the future benefits. 
 In order to cover the weaknesses of fully funded mandatory system in terms of 
assets redistribution, the distribution aspect of the pension system is attached to it from 
other sources of taxes, such as consumption taxes, capital income taxes, and labor income 
taxes, depending on the feasibility of each tax type. As has been shown earlier, for the 
case of Indonesia indirect taxes are most feasible to be applied in the system. Such a 
system is called a mixed system between defined contributions and defined benefits as 
both aspects are introduced together into one package. 
The redistribution that takes place in the mixed system can be considered a type 
of cash transfer, without any obligation from the recipient to pay any pension taxes in 
advance; that is, the benefit received is 100 percent of the transfers while the tax amount 
depends on how much the individual has already paid in the consumption taxes. However, 
consumption taxes are difficult to trace to an individual, and this depends on how much 
individuals spend of their income in the formal goods market. It is possible that an 
individual never pays the consumption taxes to the government and that he or she spends 
his or her income only in the informal goods market, where the government has no access 
to charge taxes. In that case, the redistribution of the benefit he or she receives could 
reach 100 percent.  
The distribution of cash transfers for pension necessity should be as low as 
possible, only to provide the minimum physical needs, in order to motivate people to 
work in the formal sector and to create their own fully funded pension account. This type 
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of cash transfer should also be provided temporarily. As many people become able to 
create their own pension fund, the cash transfer should be discontinued.     
 
 
The Creation of Skilled Labor (The Elimination of Informal Labor Sector) 
 
Informality impedes the government’s ability to implement fiscal policy and 
reduces the government’s ability to collect from and provide transfers to individuals, 
including the tax and transfer for pension policy. The only way to eliminate the informal 
labor sector is to educate the new entry of working force up to the level of skilled labor, 
which is up to the education level of college and university students. As people become 
more educated, they would tend to refuse to enter the informal labor sector as the pay-off 
and benefit in that sector is much lower compared to that in the formal sector. In this case, 
I assume that the industry in the formal sector is able to absorb the amount of skilled 
labor provided or the skilled labor is able to find a job in the formal sector for themselves. 
 The overview of current labor markets shows that the capacity of education sector 
in Indonesia to provide the new skilled labor is very low; see Table 6.3 below. In year 
2000, only 502 thousand people of age 20-24 in the working force received the degree of 
diploma I, II, III, and bachelor.  In year 2001, the amount increases a little bit to 514 
thousand people, in year 2002 the amount increases further to 546 thousand people, but 
decreases slightly in year 2003 to 543 thousand people. Compared to roughly 100 million 
people in the working force, roughly 500 thousand people is just 0.5 percent of the total 
working force.  
 At the same time, in year 2000 the amount of newly retired skilled labor (age 55-
59) who have the degree of diploma I, II, III, and bachelor is 190 thousand people; in 
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year 2001, the amount is 192 thousand people, in 2002 it decreased to 178 thousand 
people, and in 2003 it increased to 191 thousand people. 
 Given this information, the annual average of additional amount of skilled labor is 
around 334 thousand people. Meanwhile, the stock of skilled labor in year 2000 is 3.24 
million people, increasing to 3.30 million people in year 2001, increasing again in year 
2002 to 3.34 million people, and reaching 3.40 million people in year 2003. I calculate 
the average net incremental of skilled labor, and get the result equal to around 10 percent 
of total skilled labor each year.  
For the purpose of the elimination of a significant amount of labor in the informal 
sector within a certain time, say, by 25 percent of the current amount within 20 years, 
then the increment of total skilled labor by 10 percent annually is not sufficient. In year 
2000, the amount of unskilled labor worked in the formal sector is 28.2 million people, or 
8.2 times the amount of skilled labor worked in that sector. Still in year 2000, the amount 
of unskilled labor working in the informal sector is 58.6 million people, or 16.9 times the 
amount of skilled labor working in formal sector.  
 From year 2000 labor data, in order to eliminate 25 percent of unskilled labor in 
the informal sector, the government needs to generate an additional 15 million people of 
skilled labor. I assume that the job market is available for the skilled labor entering the 
formal sector, or that they can create one of their own. To eliminate 50 percent of 
unskilled labor in the informal sector, Indonesia needs to generate at least 29 million 
people of skilled labor. To eliminate 75 percent of unskilled labor, Indonesia needs an 
additional 44 million people skilled labor. To eliminate the whole informal sector means 
that the Indonesian government needs at least additional 58.6 million people. I also  
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Table 16. Indonesia: The Description of Labor Market Condition 
According to Age and Education (in Thousand People) 
1999 >15 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 >60 
Up to Primary School 43345 3510 5473 6068 5645 5536 4831 3903 2913 2027 3439 
Junior High School 15485 1254 1955 2168 2017 1978 1726 1394 1041 724 1229 
Senior High School 32887 2663 4152 4604 4283 4200 3666 2961 2210 1538 2609 
Diploma: 1 & 2 year 127 10 16 18 16 16 14 11 9 6 10 
Diploma: 3 Year 1298 105 164 182 169 166 145 117 87 61 103 
Bachelor 2510 203 317 351 327 321 280 226 169 117 199 
            
2000 >15 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 >60 
Up to Primary School 44777 3688 5529 6198 5865 5940 5004 4063 3042 2096 3351 
Junior High School 15997 1318 1975 2214 2095 2122 1788 1452 1087 749 1197 
Senior High School 33974 2798 4195 4703 4450 4507 3797 3083 2308 1591 2542 
Diploma: 1 & 2 year 131 11 16 18 17 17 15 12 9 6 10 
Diploma: 3 Year 1341 110 166 186 176 178 150 122 91 63 100 
Bachelor 2593 214 320 359 340 344 290 235 176 121 194 
            
2001 >15 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 >60 
Up to Primary School 45669 3720 5659 6038 5971 5913 5293 4262 3289 2116 3408 
Junior High School 16315 1329 2022 2157 2133 2112 1891 1523 1175 756 1217 
Senior High School 34650 2822 4294 4582 4530 4486 4016 3234 2496 1605 2585 
Diploma: 1 & 2 year 133 11 17 18 17 17 15 12 10 6 10 
Diploma: 3 Year 1368 111 169 181 179 177 159 128 99 63 102 
Bachelor 2645 215 328 350 346 342 306 247 190 123 197 
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Table 16 (continued) 
2002 >15 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 >60 
Up to Primary School 45459 3273 6010 6138 6148 5783 5186 4123 3303 1959 3537 
Junior High School 16240 1169 2147 2193 2197 2066 1853 1473 1180 700 1264 
Senior High School 34491 2483 4560 4657 4665 4387 3934 3128 2506 1487 2684 
Diploma: 1 & 2 year 133 10 18 18 18 17 15 12 10 6 10 
Diploma: 3 Year 1361 98 180 184 184 173 155 123 99 59 106 
Bachelor 2632 190 348 355 356 335 300 239 191 113 205 
            
2003 >15 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 >60 
Up to Primary School 47116 3643 5981 6083 6174 5992 5404 4391 3552 2106 3790 
Junior High School 16832 1301 2137 2173 2205 2141 1931 1569 1269 752 1354 
Senior High School 35748 2764 4538 4616 4684 4546 4100 3332 2695 1598 2876 
Diploma: 1 & 2 year 138 11 17 18 18 17 16 13 10 6 11 
Diploma: 3 Year 1411 109 179 182 185 179 162 132 106 63 114 
Bachelor 2728 211 346 352 357 347 313 254 206 122 219 
Source: Widjaja’s calculation, from Indonesian Central Board of Statistics Raw Data.
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assume in these calculations that the formal labor sector is able to employ the rest of the 
28 million people of unskilled labor, as the sector will still need to employ that amount. 
Next, I analyze the impact of creating skilled labor on the government budget. 
 
The Budget Impact of Skilled Labor Creation 
The skilled labor creation will have an impact on government expenditures. On 
one hand, it will increase government expenditures for education. On the other hand, it 
will reduce the government expenditure for the redistribution of pension expenditures. I 
examine each issue. 
 
The Education Budget. Given the price level and income level of year 2000, there are 
3.3 million college and university students. For the government expenditures on 
education (Table 17) in year 2000, Rp. 6.4 trillion is spent to support 3.3 million college 
and university students.  In year 2001, Rp. 4.4 trillion is expensed to support 2.9 million 
college and university students. In year 2002, Rp. 4.6 trillion is spent to support 3.4 
million college and university students.  
By using the elasticity of government expenditure on skilled labor creation 
estimated in Table 12, I estimate the additional amount of government budget for 
education of skilled labor. From Table 16 and Table 17, in year 2000 the government 
created 502 thousand skilled labors from 3.3 million college and university students, or 
13.2 percent of skilled labor from the stock amount of college students. In year 2001, it 
created 514 thousand skilled laborers out of 2.9 million college and university students, 
or 17.7 percent of skilled labor. In year 2002, 546 thousand skilled labors were created 
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out of 3.4 million college and university students, or 16.1 percent. Finally, in year 2003, 
543 thousand skilled labors were created out of 3.5 million college and university 
students, or 15.3 percent. 
The average of skilled labor production over those 4 years is 15.6 percent 
annually. Therefore, in order to eliminate 25 percent of unskilled labor in the informal 
labor market, or to create around 15 million skilled laborers, Indonesia must educate 
around 96.2 million students at the college and university level. 
Supposing that the creation of skilled labor occurs within 20 years of time, then 
the amount of college and university student must increase by 4.8 million people annually, 
or almost 1.5 times of the 2000-2003 average level or 3.3 million students. With an 
elasticity of government expenditure per skilled labor creation equal to 0.296, or roughly 
0.3,  then the government expenditure for the skilled labor creation should be increased 
by five times of the current average annual government education expenditure amount 
(Rp. 5.2 trillion), or an increase to a minimum Rp. 26 trillion annually.  
 By using the same argument, eliminating 50 percent of skilled labor within 20 
years needs an increase of ten times government education expenditure to Rp. 52 trillion 
annually, eliminating 75 percent of skilled labor within 20 years needs an increase of 
fifteen times government education expenditure to Rp. 78 trillion annually, and 
eliminating 100 percent of skilled labor within 20 years needs an increase of forty times 
government education expenditure to Rp. 104 trillion annually. These calculations 
assume that the elasticity of GDP per capita towards skilled labor education does not 
change over time. 
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 Still from Table 16, it can be seen that that the amount of government budget in 
year 2000 is Rp. 279.4 trillion, rising to Rp. 341.5 trillion in year 2001, to Rp. 345.6 
trillion in year 2002, and to Rp. 370.6 trillion in year 2003. The annual average of 
government expenditure for the four years is Rp. 334.3 trillion. If the central government 
commits to set the increase of 25 percent skilled labor within 20 years, the education 
expenditures must be around Rp. 26 trillion out of Rp. 334.3 trillion, or a minimum 7.8 
percent of the annual government budget. Therefore, the increase of 50 percent skilled 
labor within 20 years requires roughly 8 percent of the annual government budget.  I 
assume that this increase is feasible. 
 
 
Table 17. Indonesia: The Central Government Education Expenditure 
Year 
College and 
University 
Student  
(million people) 
Government 
Education 
Expenditure 
(trillion Rp). 
Government 
Total 
Expenditure 
(trillion Rp). 
Share of Government 
Education Expenditure to 
Total Expenditure 
(percent) 
1999 3.12 6.0 231.9            2.61  
2000 3.33 6.4 279.4            2.91  
2001 2.91 4.4 341.5            1.30  
2002 3.40 4.6 345.6            1.32  
2003 3.55 5.4 370.6            1.45  
2004 3.70 19.2 430.0            4.46  
Source: a. "Republic of Indonesia Financial Note and Central Government Budget " (various) 
             b. "The population of Indonesia" (various)  
 
 
The Pension Budget. There is also an impact from the elimination of informal labor on 
the government cash transfers for retirees. The government will be able to cut its pension 
cash transfers to the working population who are able to pay for their own fully-funded 
future pension, which means that the elimination of labor who work in the informal 
sector through education will eradicate the pension burden on government budget as well. 
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  Suppose that the government is able to eliminate 25 percent of year 2000 
unskilled labor in the future, an amount of 15 million people who will retire in the year 
2040. Supposed also that the government sets the cash transfer at 100 percent of the year 
2040 poverty line. Then the amount that can be saved in the government budget from not 
paying the transfer to 15 million people is around Rp.100 billion annually (calculated 
from Table 6).  Compare this to the increase of education expenditure for the same 
amount of skilled labor creation (or Rp. 26 trillion annually), the amount to be saved 
from pension expenditure is relatively small. However, one should also take into account 
the contribution of skilled labor to the GDP as they start entering the working force and 
start paying taxes revenue from their increased labor income.  
 
 
95 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
The Analysis of the Calibration Results 
 
 
The purposes of calibration in this chapter are first to look at the distribution of 
excess burden of welfare across generations before and after the consumption tax for cash 
transfers is imposed, and second to look at the amount (and the distribution across sectors) 
of labor in the economy before and after the tax. In doing so, I assume that workers are 
able to choose their optimal working hours due to changes in consumption tax. The 
assumption affects the behavioral parameter consumption share. The consumption share 
is the parameter that sets the amount of working hour spent by labor.10 The model 
calibrated only skilled and unskilled labor in the formal production sector because data 
for production and labor are not available in the informal production sector. 
 
The Distribution of Tax Burden across Generations 
The distribution of excess burden here is calculated by using the Hicksian 
Equivalent Variation (EV). The EV means the minimum amount of monetary value 
needed to compensate the individual for different prices. The calibration is made for 
taxation under USD 1, USD 2, and USD 3 cash transfers. The calculation of Equivalent 
Variation assumes that an additional consumption tax is compensated by reducing the 
same amount of either capital income tax or labor income tax. Examples and formula of 
EV calculation can be found in Ballard, Fullerton, Shoven, and Whalley (1985) and 
Creedy (2003). 
                                                 
10 Consumption expenditure equals wages multiplied by working hours. Aggregate consumption then 
equals the sum of labor amount multiplied by wages multiplied by working hours.  
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 It is useful to make clear the relative magnitudes of the consumption tax and the 
cash transfers. For USD 1 cash transfer per day per person, the amount of additional 
consumption taxes collected is Rp. 58.3 billion for the year 2000. The amount becomes 
Rp. 116.6 billion for the USD 2 cash transfer and Rp. 174.9 billion for the USD 3 cash 
transfer. The year 2000 consumption expenditures are Rp. 937.5 billion, while the 
existing consumption taxes are Rp. 69.9 billion or 7.5 percent of the year 2000 
consumption expenditures. If the central government charge taxes of Rp. 58.3 billion 
from the consumption expenditures, then the consumption taxes collected become Rp. 
128.2 billion while the tax base becomes Rp. 879.2 billion. The tax effort becomes 14.6 
percent (128.2 divided by 879.2), or almost twice as high as the initial consumption tax 
rate. For additional consumption taxes of Rp. 116.6 billion, the consumption taxes 
collected become Rp. 186.5 billion, while the tax base becomes Rp. 820.9 billion. The tax 
effort becomes 22.7 percent (186.5 divided by 820.9) after the additional consumption 
tax for USD 2 cash transfer. Finally, for additional consumption taxes Rp. 174.9 billion, 
the total consumption taxes amount equals Rp. 244.8 billion, while the tax base becomes 
Rp. 692.7 billion. The tax rate after a consumption tax for the USD 3 cash transfer is 35.3 
percent (244.8 divided by 692.7). 
 Assuming that the additional consumption tax is financed by labor income, the 
additional consumption tax can be seen as another way to tax labor income. The year 
2000 disposable labor income is Rp. 630.9 billion, with the initial tax amount Rp. 11.3 
billion. The initial tax rate is 1.8 percent (11.3 divided by 630.9). Adding Rp. 58.3 billion, 
the labor tax amount increases to Rp. 69.6 billion, while the labor income reduces to Rp. 
572.6. The labor income tax rate reaches 12.2 percent (69.6 divided by 572.6). By doing 
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the same calculation procedure, I get the labor income tax rate 24.9 percent and 40.8 
percent after the additional consumption tax for the USD 2 cash transfer and the USD 3 
cash transfer, respectively.    
I assume in the calibration that labor is able to optimize their working hours after 
government sets additional consumption taxes. For notation examples of the generations, 
“-40” indicates the generation born 40 years before the policy takes place in year 0; 
generation “0” is the generation born in year 0; generation “40” is the generation born 40 
years after the policy takes place in year 0. Terminal generations are the last generations 
in the sequence, generations “80” to “120”. These generations are of particular 
importance because the EV values converged at these generations.11 
 
USD 1 cash transfer.  Under consumption tax for USD 1 cash transfer (Appendix B, 
Table B.1), the consumption tax rate increases to 14.6 percent. The skilled labor’s EV is 
the same for both taxations under capital income and labor income compensations. The 
value of EV ranges from the smallest 0.00 percent at generation “-30” to the highest 0.32 
percent at terminal generations. The total welfare gain for the whole generation of skilled 
labor is Rp. 69.18 billion at year 2000 prices.  Still under consumption tax for USD 1 
cash transfer, unskilled labor’s EV is also the same for both taxation under capital income 
or labor income compensation. EV ranges from the smallest -0.01 percent at terminal 
generations to the highest 1.43 percent at the “5” and “10” generations. The total welfare 
loss for the whole generation of unskilled labor is Rp. 1.18 billion at year 2000 prices.  
                                                 
11 Convergence is made to adjust the changes of the utility function to the changes of domestic interest rate 
towards the world interest rate due to the small open economy feature. For more information, see 
Rasmussen and Rutherford (2004). 
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Several things should be noted from these EV calculations for the consumption 
tax of USD 1 cash transfer. The EV under capital income compensation or labor income 
compensation is the same for both skilled and unskilled labor, which means that if labors 
are elastic towards their working hours, then welfare effect of consumption tax is 
indifferent whether financed by capital income or labor income taxes. Comparing both 
EV movements, skilled labor’s EV has several peaks while unskilled labor’s EV keeps 
going up to single peak (Appendix C, Figure C.1).  In addition, the EV for unskilled labor 
is higher for both capital income and labor income compensation because the amount of 
unskilled labor is much higher than that of skilled labor. Meanwhile, the total welfare is 
negative for unskilled labor generations but positive for skilled labor generations, which 
means that under this consumption tax the skilled labor gets more of the benefits than 
does the unskilled labor. Finally, the current generation the unskilled labor gets more of 
the welfare benefit than the young as their EV is higher than the young’s EV.  
 
USD 2 cash transfer.  Charging a consumption tax for the USD 2 cash transfer (Appendix 
B, Table B.2) increases the consumption tax rate to 22.7 percent of total consumption. As 
before, the skilled labor’s EV is the same for both taxation under capital income or labor 
income compensation. The lowest EV, -0.90 percent, takes place at generation “-40”, 
while the highest EV is 0.48 percent at generation “-20” and generation “65”. The EV 
converges to 0.10 percent at terminal generations. The total welfare gain for the whole 
generation of skilled labor is Rp. 22.51 billion at year 2000 prices. Unskilled labor’s EV 
is also the same for both taxation under capital income or labor income compensation. 
The lowest EV, -0.17 percent, takes place at terminal generations while the highest EV, 
 
99 
 
1.40 percent, takes place at generation “10”. The total welfare gain for the whole 
generation of unskilled labor is negative Rp. 32.22 billion at year 2000 prices.  
Note that the EV under capital income compensation or labor income 
compensation is the same for both skilled and unskilled labor. The movement of skilled 
labor’s EV has more peaks compared to that of unskilled labor (Appendix C, Figure C.2). 
In addition, as happened under the EV calculation of the consumption taxes for the USD 
1 cash transfer, the EV for unskilled labor is higher for both capital income and labor 
income compensation. Meanwhile, skilled labor generations get more benefits than their 
unskilled counterparts, as indicated by the total welfare gain. Finally, the current 
generation the unskilled labor gets more of the welfare benefit than the young as their EV 
is higher than the young’s EV.  
 
USD 3 cash transfer.  The tax rate for the consumption tax for the USD 3 cash transfer is 
very high, reaching 35.2 percent. As previously happened, skilled labor’s EV for taxation 
under capital income compensation is the same as under labor income (Appendix B, 
Table B.3). The lowest EV, -0.03 percent, takes place at generation “-25” while the 
highest, 0.64 percent, takes place at generations “70” and “75”. The EV converges to 
0.08 percent at terminal generations. The total welfare gain for the whole generation of 
skilled labor under capital income compensation is Rp. 17.94 billion at year 2000 prices. 
Unskilled labor’s EV for taxation under capital income compensation is also the same as 
the one under labor income compensation. The lowest EV, -0.52 percent, takes place at 
terminal generations, while the highest EV, 1.40 percent, takes place at generation “5”. 
 
100 
 
The total welfare loss for the whole generation of unskilled labor is Rp. 98.50 billion at 
year 2000 prices.  
Note finally that the EV under capital income compensation is the same as the one 
under labor income compensation for both skilled and unskilled labor.  Comparing the 
EV movement of the skilled labor and the unskilled labor, the one under skilled labor has 
several peaks, while the one under unskilled labor has only a single peak (Appendix C, 
Figure C.3). The EV for unskilled labor is higher under both capital income and labor 
income compensation, as the absolute amount of unskilled labor is higher than that of 
skilled labor. Skilled labor gets more of the benefit than unskilled labor as the absolute 
welfare gain is positive for skilled labor but negative for unskilled labor. Again, the 
current generation the unskilled labor gets more of the welfare benefit than the young as 
their EV is higher than the young’s EV.  
 
The Labor Amount after Taxation 
The typical assumption in the labor amount analysis is similar to the one in EV 
analysis: labor is able to optimize their working hours after taxation. The labor analyzed 
here are again the skilled labor and unskilled labor in the formal production sector only 
because the profile of unskilled labor in the informal production sector is not available.  
The calibration here is first done under consumption taxes for USD 1, USD 2, and USD 3 
cash transfers, in order to compare the results here with the earlier results.. I then do 
calibration under a fully funded savings pension program to observe which pension plan 
generates the maximum amount of labor in the formal production sector.  
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I start the analysis by setting the amount of labor at time 0 (the time when the 
policy starts) equal to 1.00 before the additional consumption tax for both skilled and 
unskilled labor is imposed. The 1.00 index represents 100 percent of the amount of labor 
at the initial condition. Due to the feature of CGE model, the growth of skilled and 
unskilled labor follows the growth of population in the model, constant at one percent 
annually or five percent for every time interval. This population growth holds before and 
after the additional consumption tax so that the initial ratio of skilled to unskilled labor 
also equals 1.00 for every time interval. This CGE feature simplifies the analysis because 
any changes of the first data in the observed series already represent changes of the rest. 
Notice that the initial consumption tax rate is 7.5 percent and the labor income tax rate is 
1.8 percent.  
 
USD 1 cash transfer.  After the additional consumption tax for the USD 1 cash transfer, 
the consumption tax rate becomes 14.6 percent. Assuming that the consumption 
expenditure is financed by labor income, the additional consumption tax rate at 7.1 
percent is equivalent to an additional labor income tax rate of 10.4 percent. The new 
labor income tax rate is 12.2 percent. At time 0, the index of skilled labor increases to 
1.14, an increase of 14 percent from the base index, and the index of unskilled labor also 
increases to 1.15, an increase of 15 percent from the base index.  This means that a 
consumption tax of USD 1 provides an incentive for labor, both skilled and unskilled, to 
enter the formal production sector. Additional consumption tax increases the purchasing 
price of the goods produced in the formal sector, and, in order to maintain utility, skilled 
and unskilled labor need higher wages that are available only in the formal production 
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sector. Notice that after taxation the index of unskilled labor increases slightly more than 
that of the skilled labor. The additional consumption tax for the USD 1 cash transfer 
slightly decreases the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor. 
 
USD 2 cash transfer.  An additional consumption tax for the USD 2 cash transfer 
generates a different impact on the labor amount in the formal production sector. The 
consumption tax rate becomes 22.7 percent, and its equivalent labor income tax rate 
becomes 24.9 percent. After the additional consumption tax, at time 0, the index of 
skilled labor still decreases to 0.82, 18 percent less than the initial index, and the index of 
unskilled labor also decreases to 0.85, a 15 percent decrease from the initial index. Notice 
that after taxation, it is the skilled labor that leaves the formal production sector the most.  
 
USD 3 cash transfer.  An additional consumption tax for USD 3 cash transfer also 
provides incentives for labor to leave the formal production sector. The consumption tax 
rate reaches 35.2 percent and its equivalent labor income tax rate reaches 40.8 percent. At 
time 0, the index of skilled labor amount goes down to 0.78, and the index of unskilled 
labor amount goes down as well into 0.75. Compared to the decreasing rate of the 
consumption tax for the USD 2 cash transfer, the decreasing rate of skilled labor is 22 
percent, but unskilled labor increases into 25 percent. Clearly, a consumption tax rate that 
is too high prompts unskilled labor to leaves the formal sector the most. As a result, the 
ratio of skilled labor to unskilled index increases.  
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Summary.  Which policy is optimal? If the goal of this policy is to provide incentives for 
labor to enter the formal production sector, then the calibration result predicts that a 
consumption tax that finances the USD 1 cash transfer provides the highest incentives for 
labor to work in the formal sector. Its amount of skilled labor and unskilled labor is the 
highest among the three policies, and also higher than the initial labor amount. An 
additional consumption tax for the USD 2 cash transfer provides incentives for both types 
of labor to leave the formal production sector so that it is not a good policy choice. The 
consumption tax for the USD 3 cash transfer is also not a good choice since it provides 
incentives for both skilled and unskilled labors to leave the formal production sector, with 
unskilled labors leaving the most. 
 
 
The Mandatory Fully Funded Pension Policy 
Even though it is a mandatory pension program, a fully funded pension is a type 
of savings program, different from a pay-as-you-go pension system. It changes the 
relative price of consumption today and consumption in the retirement. However, 
because it is a “forced” savings plan and here involves taxation of labor income, the set-
up is assumed to be based on the principle of the highest amount of labor in the formal 
production sector, for both skilled and unskilled labors type. 
This mandatory fully funded pension set-up comes after the consumption tax is 
determined because only labor that has a relatively high income (e.g., a minimum average 
Rp. 60 million annually, using the standard of average skilled labor in Indonesia) can 
participate in the fully funded pension fund. At the beginning of the program, not all 
labor is able to participate in the fully funded pension program. Most of the labor that is 
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able to participate at the beginning is skilled labor, whose labor income is relatively high.  
Later on as the program develops, it is expected that other labor will be included in each 
group.  The fully funded pension program will gradually replace the cash transfer pension. 
Sometime in the future, as each labor has sufficient individual pension savings, the cash 
transfer program is expected to be terminated. Therefore, the set-up of the fully funded 
pension savings follows the best set-up of the consumption tax system that provides the 
highest incentives for labor to work in the formal production sector.  
 The analysis of the fully funded pension set-up also based on assumption that 
laborers are able to adjust their working hours. It is also assumed that the central 
government has already chosen and run the consumption tax for the USD 1 cash transfer. 
Because the fully funded pension plan links the contribution and the benefit, I analyze the 
pension set up under 100 percent labor income finance (fully paid by the labor) and fifty-
fifty finance (50 percent paid by the labor - 50 percent paid by the firm). The tax rate is 
10 percent of skilled labor income, or Rp. 20.6 billion. As has been discussed in Chapter 
Six, the 10 percent rate is based on the Law No. 11/1969. 
The initial labor income tax rate after the consumption tax for the USD 1 cash 
transfer is 12.2 percent, while the corporate capital income tax rate is 34.0 percent. 
Additional fully funded savings tax of Rp. 20.6 billion increases the labor income tax rate 
to 16.3 percent, while an additional Rp. 10.3 billion increases the labor income tax rate to 
14.2 percent. Finally, an additional Rp. 10.3 billion fully funded savings tax increases the 
capital income tax rate to 36.6 percent.  
 The result for the additional fully funded pension savings simulation is shown in 
Appendix B, Table B.4.  After the government charges 10 percent taxes on fully funded 
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savings, the labor income tax rate becomes 16.3 percent, and the index of skilled labor 
decreases to 1.02 from 1.14, a decrease of 0.12 index points or a 10.5 percent decrease of 
skilled labor. Meanwhile, the index of unskilled labor decreases as well from 1.15 to 1.01, 
a decrease of 0.14 index points or 12.2 percent of unskilled labor. Because the tax is 
taken fully from the labor income, the reduction of the labor amount is purely the effect 
of labor movement between sectors of production. 
Still from Appendix B, Table B.4, the additional 50-50 funding of fully funded 
pension savings taxes shows that the additional taxes reduces the index of skilled labor 
from 1.14 into 0.69, a reduction of 0.45 index points or 39.5 percent of skilled labor 
amount. The taxation also reduces the index of unskilled labor from 1.15 to 0.73, a 
reduction of 0.42 index points or 36.5 percent of unskilled labor amount. At this time, the 
labor income tax rate is 14.2 percent, and the capital income tax rate is 36.6 percent. 
Because the taxes reduce both capital and labor income, the effect of labor reduction in 
this case is due to the movement of firms from the formal sector to the informal sector, as 
well as to the movement of labor themselves. The capital income tax rate is already quite 
high in the initial equilibrium, so that firms could not bear any additional expense for 
labor pension anymore.  
 
Several Issues on Informal Production Sector 
The informal production sector is a grey area of the economy of developing 
countries; that is, informal production exists but its magnitude existence is unknown. It is 
difficult to measure the output of that sector as production, as well as the number of 
individuals or firms, is not reported to or registered by the government (Palmade and 
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Anayiotos, 2005). Firms operating in the informal production sector can be divided into 
two types: quasi informal sector and real informal sector. Firms in the quasi informal 
sector are capable of operating in the formal production sector but for some reasons, like 
tax avoidance, they stay in the informal production sector. They have some significant 
amounts of capital and some significant amounts of labor. In contrast, firms in the real 
informal sector have little capital and labor, and may quit business easily (Azuma and 
Grossman, 2002). In the model building in Chapter Four, I assume that all firms are 
homogenous, as is typical of the real informal sector. This assumption holds as the 
government actually can easily observe large quasi informal sector firms, in term of both 
labor and capital, and can require them move to the formal sector.  
The real informal sector firms find it difficult to accumulate capital in the long run. 
In addition to that, wages and productivity of labor become unobservable. Therefore, it is 
relatively difficult to construct an applied production model of the real informal sector 
that predicts the movement of capital and labor. However, the amount of labor in the 
informal sector can be inferred from the amount of labor that works in the formal sector. 
Although skilled and unskilled labors exist in the informal sector, most of the labor in the 
informal sector is of typically unskilled. Only a small amount of skilled labor works in 
the informal sector, i.e., only 0.5 percent of the total labor for the case of Indonesian 
labor. The sum of the percentages of skilled labor in the formal sector, unskilled labor in 
the formal sector, and unskilled labor in the informal sector is obviously equal to 100 
percent. Therefore, if there is a decrease in the amount of total (skilled or unskilled) labor 
in the formal sector, readers may infer that the amount of labor in the informal sector 
increases. This is the approach taken here. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
The Analysis of Economic Growth 
 
Economic growth is affected by several aspects of the central government 
behavior in setting up the pension plans that I have examined. In Chapter Eight, I analyze 
the impact of creating skilled labor on economic growth, followed by an analysis of the 
impact of taxing additional consumption for cash transfers on economic growth, and 
concluding with an analysis of the impact of setting up the fully funded pension plan on 
economic growth. 
 
Creating Skilled Labor 
From the year 2000 Indonesian Social Accounting Matrix (size 38*38), it can be 
estimated that the income of skilled labor in that year is Rp. 206.9 trillion. With 3.45 
million skilled laborers, the average income per skilled labor is Rp. 59.97 million, or 
roughly Rp. 60 million per year.12  In the same year, the total income of unskilled 
laborers in the formal sector is 190.5 trillion, and the amount of unskilled labor in the 
formal sector is 28.21 million people, so that the average income of unskilled labor in the 
formal sector in year 2000 is Rp. 6.7 million per year.   
Now suppose that the government is able to increase skilled workers by 0.75 
million people annually, according to the target scenario I have discussed earlier. Assume 
also that the job market is able to absorb these amounts of labor. The implication is that 
this policy will increase the total income of labor by 0.75 million times Rp. 53.3 million 
(the difference between skilled labor and unskilled labor income), equal to roughly Rp. 
                                                 
12 This amount equals to USD 6000 per year with the exchange rate Rp. 10.000 per USD. 
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40 trillion per year. In terms of GDP, this increase is roughly equal to 3.2 percent of year 
2000 Indonesian GDP. (Indonesian year 2000 GDP equals Rp. 1,264.9 trillion.) 
Comparing the increase of the value added of labor (Rp. 40 trillion) to the 
government expenditure needed to create this amount of skilled labor (Rp. 26 trillion), I 
evaluate that the contribution of the skilled labor income to the economy outweighs the 
government expenditure. In turn, the increase of labor income will increase consumption 
expenditure. Since the average consumption expenditure in Indonesia is 60 percent to 70 
percent of GDP, I assume that the increase in labor income would also increase the 
consumption expenditure around 60 percent times Rp. 40 trillion, or Rp. 24 trillion. An 
increase of Rp. 24 trillion in consumption expenditure equals an increase of 2.5 percent 
of year 2000 consumption expenditure (Rp. 937.5 trillion). Assume also that the central 
government charges a 7 percent consumption tax on the increase of consumption, where 
the 7 percent rate is the year 2000 tax effort on consumption expenditure. The additional 
government revenue from an increase in consumption taxes is Rp. 1.7 trillion, or an 
increase of 0.85 percent of year 2000 of the central government tax revenue (Rp.195.5 
trillion). 
 
Providing Cash Transfers 
However, the government effort to redistribute income through the increase in the 
consumption tax would probably have a negative impact on economic growth. Suppose 
that the central government is able to collect the Rp 58.3 trillion for the USD 1 per day 
cash transfer and redistribute them to the retired population. This amount equals 6.2 
percent of year 2000 consumption expenditure. For the retired population, the amount is 
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considered as an income. Therefore, there is a possibility that they would not expend all 
the cash transfer into consumption.  Following the average consumption expenditure of 
income, suppose that they expend only 60 percent of the cash transfers so that they 
reduce the consumption amount by 40 percent of Rp. 58.3 trillion or Rp. 23.3 trillion. The 
transfers would probably reduce the year 2000 Indonesian GDP by 1.8 percent. However, 
because the amount of transfer is relatively a small portion of individuals’ monthly 
expenditures (or only Rp. 300 thousand per month), it would probably be spent fully for  
individual consumption. In the latter case, the transfer would not cause a negative impact 
on economic growth because all the transfers are turn back into consumption. 
 
Establishing a Fully Funded Savings System 
Finally, in the case of a fully funded savings system, in the short run this reduces  
current consumption and increases savings. Also because there is only little information 
regarding how savings are turned into investment in Indonesia, I predict that the increase 
in savings will reduce economic growth in the short run. If the fully funded pension 
program takes 10 percent of skilled labor income into savings, or around Rp. 20.7 trillion, 
it would reduce the year 2000 Indonesian GDP by the same amount, or 1.6 percent. 
However, within 20 to 30 years, as skilled labor retires, the savings would be turned into 
cash and spent in terms of consumption again, so it is like transferring the current 
consumption into future consumption. The current economic growth is reduced by the 
fully funded program, but the future consumption would likely increase. In this case, I 
assume that the pension fund institutions are trustable, so that they would invest the 
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savings fund in a profitable manner and keep the fund intact until the time of 
disbursement. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
 
Final Conclusions 
 
 
As the absolute and relative amount of the retired population increases in 
Indonesia, there emerges a need for Indonesia to have an integrated pension program. 
Support from family members for the elderly would be discontinued eventually because 
the amount of children in one family is getting smaller, the elderly live longer, and the 
family is becoming more and more fragmented, as children are no longer live with their 
parents after married (McKee, 2006). The pension program must fit the characteristics of 
Indonesia as a developing country, where output markets and labor markets are massive 
in the informal sector. As the central government has little ability to collect taxes in the 
informal sector, any social security taxation in the formal sector could make firms and 
labor move from a formal sector to an informal sector. Therefore, an investigation of the 
type of pension reform and its financing is necessary.  This is the broad purpose of this 
dissertation. 
 Experiences from developing countries like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and 
China have shown that a combination of defined benefits in one program and defined 
contributions in another program can fit the pension system for a country with a massive 
informal sector, both in the output market and in the labor market. The two programs 
together serve the redistribution purpose on the one hand and the savings purpose on the 
other hand. The separation of the purposes is meant to prevent the application of a 
pension system causing labor and firms to move to the informal sector, as well as to 
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maintain the sustainability of the program by insulating the program from the aging 
problem. 
 Using an overlapping generation model, the analysis of sources of financing for 
the Indonesian redistribution program shows that consumption tax financing fits the main 
criteria as the source of redistribution financing. One implication of the additional 
taxation on consumption is additional burdens on generations. As generations distribute 
the tax burden among them, the analysis of equivalent variation for the tax burden 
distribution shows that skilled labor generations bear fewer burdens than that of unskilled 
labor under a consumption tax that finances a USD 1 cash transfer (a 14.6 percent 
consumption tax rate), under a consumption tax for a USD 2 cash transfer (a 24.9 percent 
consumption tax rate), and under a consumption tax for a USD 3 cash transfer (a35.3 
percent consumption tax rate). 
 The analysis of the impact of a consumption tax on the amount of skilled and 
unskilled labor shows that the consumption tax for a USD 1 cash transfer provides the 
highest incentives for the skilled and unskilled labor to work in the formal sector, an 
increase by 14 percent skilled labor and 15 percent unskilled labor.  The consumption tax 
rate is 14.6 percent, and its equivalent labor income tax rate is 12.2 percent. The 
consumption tax for a USD 2 cash transfer would decrease by 18 percent skilled labor 
and by 15 percent of unskilled labor in the formal sector, while the consumption tax for a 
USD 3 cash transfer would decrease skilled labor by 22 percent and unskilled labor by 25 
percent. In addition, the set up of a fully-funded pension after the consumption tax for the 
USD 1 cash transfer shows 100 percent labor income financing is the one that provides 
the highest incentives for skilled and unskilled labor to work in the formal sector. In 
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contrast, an alternative financing split of 50 percent labor income tax and 50 percent 
capital income financing would stimulate the firms and both skilled and unskilled labor to 
leave the formal sector. The initial tax rate of capital income has already been too high, 
so that any additional tax rate for pensions would move the firms to the informal sector.    
   For the fully funded pension system to work in a long run, say, over 50 years, 
there is a requirement that the size of formal labor sector is wide enough and the amount 
of skilled labor supporting it is vast enough. There is no standard benchmark, but here I 
set 25 percent of total labor as skilled labor for the minimum requirement. The effort to 
reach 25 percent of total labor within 20 years (or 1.25 percent annually) will require 8 
percent of annual government budgets be devoted to education. By using the average of 
year 2000-2003 government budget, this amount equals Rp. 26 billion per year.  
For the analysis of economic growth, skilled labor creation to eliminate 25 
percent of labor in the informal sector would increase labor value added by Rp. 39 billion, 
or 3.1 percent of year 2000 GDP.  In the future (year  2040), if the government plans to 
reduce cash transfers to individuals, the amount that can be saved in the government 
budget from not paying the transfer is Rp. 100 billion per year, assuming that the transfer 
is at 100 percent of poverty line. However, the increase of the consumption tax rate for 
redistribution would probably reduce the economic growth by the average savings rate 
multiplied by the consumption tax rate. The smaller the savings rate, the lower is  
economic growth, as the additional consumption tax rate has been targeted.  In addition, 
the application of a fully funded savings pension plan would also reduce the current 
economic growth but would likely increase the future one when the pensioners disburse 
their savings from the pension plan. 
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Finally, there are two propositions that I can contribute to the theory of public 
finance. First, in an economy with a large informal production and labor sector, 
consumption taxes are preferable to income taxation because my results indicate that 
consumption taxes are more likely to induce the movement of labor to the formal sector. 
In addition, the consumption tax must be paid in some way by every household whether 
they produce in the formal sector or informal sector. Second, given formal and informal 
labor markets in an economy, where the informal labor market is dominant; there exists 
an optimal consumption tax rate that provides an incentive to the highest amount of labor 
to work in the formal sector. It is time and the application of taxation that will prove the 
accuracy of these two propositions. 
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Appendix A 
Examples of Country with Formal - Informal Labor Economy 
Running Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Pension System 
 
Countries Funding Contribution Benefits 
  Percent of Employees Earning  
    
Argentina Multi-pillar system   
 Pillar 1 : Flat Benefit 6 percent -16 percent paid by employee Flat - 30 percent of male average wage 
 Pillar 2 : Funded Individual Accounts 11 percent  paid by employee annuity  
         many private funds  minimum benefit $140 after 10 years' service 
    
Brazil Two main regimes :   
 Private Sector Workers (RGPS) 8 percent paid by the employer minimum wage or  
         pay-as-you-go basis some amount by employees up to  average of last 3 year wage 
  a ceiling, min 30 years contribution  
    
 Civil Servant (RPPS) 11 percent paid by the employees  
    
Chile Multi-pillar system   
 Pillar 1 : Minimum Pension Guarantee (MPG) Financed from Gov general revenues MPG (27 percent of male average wage) 
 Pillar 2 : Funded Individual Accounts 13 percent paid by employee annuity  
           many private funds   
    
China Multi-pillar system   
 Pillar 1 : Minimum Pension Guarantee (MPG) Financed from employer’s account by  20 percent of average wage 
  17 percent of employee’s wage,   
  min 15 years of working time  
    
 Pillar 2 : Funded Individual Accounts employer  contribution : 3 percent of  wage    
  employee  contribution : 8 percent of wage  
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Appendix A (continued) 
 
Countries Funding Contribution Benefits 
  Percent of Employees Earning  
    
Mexico Multi-pillar system   
 Pillar 1 : Social Quota (SQ) + 5.5% of minimum wage paid by Gov annuity 
              Minimum Pension Guarantee (MPG)   
 Pillar 2 : Funded Individual Accounts 6.5% paid by employee annuity 
 Many private funds  1 minimum wage after 25 years' contribution 
    
Source : Dunaway and Arora (2007), Filho (2005), James et al. (2003)
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Appendix B 
The Calibration Results 
 
Table B.1 
The Percent Change of the Equivalent Variation  
Of Skilled and Unskilled Labor in the Formal Sector 
Of Additional Consumption Tax 
USD 1 Cash Transfer 
 
 Skilled Labor Unskilled Labor 
Generation 
Capital 
Income 
Compensated 
Labor  
Income 
Compensated 
Capital 
Income 
Compensated 
Labor  
Income 
Compensated 
-40 0.26 0.26 0.93 0.93 
-35 0.26 0.26 1.08 1.08 
-30 0.00 0.00 1.03 1.03 
-25 0.07 0.07 1.16 1.16 
-20 0.11 0.11 1.23 1.23 
-15 0.25 0.25 1.30 1.30 
-10 0.05 0.05 1.39 1.39 
-5 0.16 0.16 1.38 1.38 
-0 0.07 0.07 1.35 1.35 
5 0.08 0.08 1.43 1.43 
10 0.09 0.09 1.43 1.43 
15 0.10 0.10 1.42 1.42 
20 0.10 0.10 1.40 1.40 
25 0.11 0.11 1.36 1.36 
30 0.11 0.11 1.31 1.31 
35 0.12 0.12 1.25 1.25 
40 0.12 0.12 1.18 1.18 
45 0.13 0.13 1.08 1.08 
50 0.15 0.15 0.97 0.97 
55 0.17 0.17 0.83 0.83 
60 0.19 0.19 0.68 0.68 
65 0.21 0.21 0.52 0.52 
70 0.24 0.24 0.34 0.34 
75 0.27 0.27 0.17 0.17 
80 0.32 0.32 -0.01 -0.01 
85 0.32 0.32 -0.01 -0.01 
90 0.32 0.32 -0.01 -0.01 
95 0.32 0.32 -0.01 -0.01 
100 0.32 0.32 -0.01 -0.01 
105 0.32 0.32 -0.01 -0.01 
110 0.32 0.32 -0.01 -0.01 
115 0.32 0.32 -0.01 -0.01 
120 0.32 0.32 -0.01 -0.01 
     
Welfare Gain 69.18 69.18 -1.18 -1.18 
2000 Rp Billion     
Source : Widjaja, calibration result. 
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Table B.2 
The Percent Change of the Equivalent Variation  
Of Skilled and Unskilled Labor in the Formal Sector 
Of Additional Consumption Tax 
USD 2 Cash Transfer 
                                                                                                            
 Skilled Labor Unskilled Labor 
Generation 
Capital Income 
Compensated 
Labor  
Income 
Compensated 
Capital Income 
Compensated 
Labor  
Income 
Compensated 
-40 -0.90 -0.90 0.86 0.86 
-35 0.75 0.75 1.04 1.04 
-30 -0.12 -0.12 1.00 1.00 
-25 -0.04 -0.04 1.13 1.13 
-20 0.48 0.48 1.18 1.18 
-15 0.38 0.38 1.25 1.25 
-10 0.10 0.10 1.33 1.33 
-5 -0.29 -0.29 1.31 1.31 
0 0.13 0.13 1.29 1.29 
5 0.12 0.12 1.38 1.38 
10 0.15 0.15 1.40 1.40 
15 0.14 0.14 1.39 1.39 
20 0.12 0.12 1.38 1.38 
25 0.11 0.11 1.35 1.35 
30 0.10 0.10 1.30 1.30 
35 0.10 0.10 1.23 1.23 
40 0.14 0.14 1.13 1.13 
45 0.18 0.18 1.02 1.02 
50 0.23 0.23 0.89 0.89 
55 0.29 0.29 0.74 0.74 
60 0.37 0.37 0.56 0.56 
65 0.48 0.48 0.44 0.44 
70 -0.10 -0.10 0.23 0.23 
75 -0.01 -0.01 0.55 0.55 
80 0.10 0.10 -0.17 -0.17 
85 0.10 0.10 -0.17 -0.17 
90 0.10 0.10 -0.17 -0.17 
95 0.10 0.10 -0.17 -0.17 
100 0.10 0.10 -0.17 -0.17 
105 0.10 0.10 -0.17 -0.17 
110 0.10 0.10 -0.17 -0.17 
115 0.10 0.10 -0.17 -0.17 
120 0.10 0.10 -0.17 -0.17 
     
Welfare Gain 22.51 22.51 -32.22 -32.22 
2000 Rp Billion     
Source : Widjaja, calibration result. 
 
 
 
 
119 
 
 
Table B.3 
The Percent Change of the Equivalent Variation  
Of Skilled and Unskilled Labor in the Formal Sector 
Of Additional Consumption Tax 
USD 3 Cash Transfer 
                                                                                                                              
 Skilled Labor Unskilled Labor 
Generation 
Capital 
Income 
Compensated 
Labor  
Income 
Compensated 
Capital 
Income 
Compensated 
Labor  
Income 
Compensated 
-40 0.35 0.35 0.91 0.91 
-35 0.17 0.17 1.07 1.07 
-30 -0.02 -0.02 1.03 1.03 
-25 -0.03 -0.03 1.15 1.15 
-20 0.24 0.24 1.23 1.23 
-15 0.21 0.21 1.29 1.29 
-10 0.10 0.10 1.37 1.37 
-5 0.15 0.15 1.35 1.35 
0 0.06 0.06 1.32 1.32 
5 0.07 0.07 1.40 1.40 
10 0.10 0.10 1.37 1.37 
15 0.11 0.11 1.33 1.33 
20 0.11 0.11 1.28 1.28 
25 0.12 0.12 1.20 1.20 
30 0.13 0.13 1.11 1.11 
35 0.14 0.14 0.99 0.99 
40 0.15 0.15 0.83 0.83 
45 0.17 0.17 0.65 0.65 
50 0.20 0.20 0.45 0.45 
55 0.25 0.25 0.22 0.22 
60 0.33 0.33 0.20 0.20 
65 0.38 0.38 -0.27 -0.27 
70 0.64 0.64 -0.52 -0.52 
75 0.64 0.64 -0.52 -0.52 
80 0.08 0.08 -0.52 -0.52 
85 0.08 0.08 -0.52 -0.52 
90 0.08 0.08 -0.52 -0.52 
95 0.08 0.08 -0.52 -0.52 
100 0.08 0.08 -0.52 -0.52 
105 0.08 0.08 -0.52 -0.52 
110 0.08 0.08 -0.52 -0.52 
115 0.08 0.08 -0.52 -0.52 
120 0.08 0.08 -0.52 -0.52 
     
Welfare Gain 17.94 17.94 -98.50 -98.50 
2000 Rp Billion     
Source : Widjaja, calibration result. 
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Table B.4 
The Amount of Labor (percent) 
After Additional Consumption Tax and Fully Funded Pension Tax  
 
Before 
Consumption Tax After Consumption Tax 
Fully Funded Pension Savings After USD 1 
Consumption Tax 
   
USD 1 per day 
person         
Transfer 
USD 2 per day 
person        
Transfer 
USD 3 per day 
person        
Transfer 
10 percent Labor 
Income 
5 percent Labor Income 
and  
5 percent Capital Income 
Year LS(T) LU(T) LS(T) LU(T) LS(T) LU(T) LS(T) LU(T) LS(T) LU(T) LS(T) LU(T) 
0 1.00 1.00 1.14 1.15 0.82 0.85 0.78 0.75 1.02 1.01 0.69 0.73 
5 1.05 1.05 1.20 1.21 0.86 0.89 0.82 0.78 1.07 1.07 0.73 0.77 
10 1.10 1.10 1.26 1.27 0.91 0.94 0.87 0.82 1.12 1.12 0.77 0.81 
15 1.16 1.16 1.32 1.33 0.95 0.98 0.91 0.87 1.18 1.18 0.81 0.85 
20 1.22 1.22 1.39 1.40 1.00 1.03 0.96 0.91 1.24 1.24 0.85 0.89 
25 1.28 1.28 1.46 1.47 1.05 1.09 1.00 0.96 1.31 1.30 0.89 0.94 
30 1.35 1.35 1.54 1.55 1.11 1.14 1.06 1.01 1.37 1.37 0.93 0.99 
35 1.42 1.42 1.62 1.63 1.16 1.20 1.11 1.06 1.44 1.44 0.98 1.04 
40 1.49 1.49 1.70 1.71 1.22 1.26 1.17 1.11 1.52 1.51 1.03 1.09 
45 1.56 1.56 1.78 1.80 1.28 1.33 1.23 1.17 1.59 1.59 1.09 1.15 
50 1.64 1.64 1.88 1.89 1.35 1.39 1.29 1.23 1.67 1.67 1.14 1.20 
55 1.73 1.73 1.97 1.99 1.42 1.46 1.35 1.29 1.76 1.75 1.20 1.27 
60 1.82 1.82 2.07 2.09 1.49 1.54 1.42 1.35 1.85 1.84 1.26 1.33 
65 1.91 1.91 2.18 2.15 1.57 1.62 1.50 1.42 1.94 1.94 1.32 1.40 
70 2.01 2.01 2.29 2.31 1.65 1.70 1.57 1.50 2.04 2.04 1.39 1.47 
75 2.11 2.11 2.41 2.42 1.73 1.79 1.65 1.57 2.15 2.14 1.46 1.54 
80 2.22 2.22 2.53 2.55 1.82 1.88 1.74 1.65 2.26 2.25 1.54 1.62 
85 2.33 2.33 2.66 2.68 1.91 1.97 1.83 1.74 2.37 2.36 1.62 1.71 
90 2.45 2.45 2.79 2.81 2.01 2.08 1.92 1.83 2.49 2.48 1.70 1.79 
95 2.57 2.57 2.93 2.96 2.11 2.18 2.02 1.92 2.62 2.61 1.78 1.88 
100 2.70 2.70 3.08 3.11 2.22 2.29 2.12 2.02 2.75 2.74 1.88 1.98 
105 2.84 2.84 3.24 3.27 2.33 2.41 2.23 2.12 2.89 2.88 1.97 2.08 
110 2.99 2.99 3.41 3.43 2.45 2.53 2.34 2.23 3.04 3.03 2.07 2.19 
115 3.14 3.14 3.58 3.61 2.58 2.66 2.46 2.34 3.20 3.18 2.18 2.30 
120 3.30 3.30 3.76 3.79 2.71 2.80 2.59 2.46 3.36 3.35 2.29 2.42 
Source: Widjaja, calibration result. 
Note: LS(T) = formal sector skilled labor amount; LU(T) = formal sector unskilled labor amount  
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Appendix C 
The Figures 
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